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TRANSFINITE RECURSION IN HIGHER REVERSE MATHEMATICS
NOAH SCHWEBER
Abstract. In this paper we investigate the reverse mathematics of higher-order ana-
logues of the theory ATR0 within the framework of higher order reverse mathematics
developed by Kohlenbach [Koh05]. We define a theory RCA30, a close higher-type ana-
logue of the classical base theory RCA0, and show that it is essentially a conservative
subtheory of Kohlenbach’s base theory RCAω0 . Working over RCA
3
0, we study higher-type
analogues of statements classically equivalent to ATR0, including open and clopen deter-
minacy, as well as two choice principles, and prove several equivalences and separations.
Our main result is the separation of open and clopen determinacy for reals, using a vari-
ant of Steel forcing; in the presentation of this result, we develop a new, more flexible
framework for Steel-type forcing.
1. Introduction
The question
“What role do incomputable sets play in mathematics?”
has been a central theme in modern logic for almost as long as modern logic has existed.
Six years before Alan Turing formalized the notion of computability, van der Waerden
[vdW30] showed that the splitting set of a field is not uniformly computable from the field;
put another way, van der Waerden demonstrated the necessity of certain incomputable sets
for Galois theory. Other results, especially Turing’s solution to the Entscheidungsproblem
and the solution by Davis, Matiyasevitch, Putnam, and Robinson of Hilbert’s Tenth Prob-
lem, established the incomputability of particular sets of natural numbers of interest. In
1975, Friedman [Fri75b] initiated the axiomatic study of this question, dubbed “Reverse
Mathematics.”
Reverse mathematics requires the choice of both a common language in which to express
all analyzed theorems, and a base theory in that language over which all equivalences and
non-implications are to be proved. The natural choice of language is that of second-order
arithmetic, since it is in this language that computability-theoretic principles are most
naturally expressed. The base theory is taken to be RCA0, a precise definition of which
is contained in [Sim99]; as a base theory, RCA0 is justified by the fact that it captures
exactly “computable” mathematics, in the sense that the ω-models of RCA0 are precisely
the Turing ideals. One notable feature of reverse mathematics is the existence of the “Big
The author is grateful to Antonio Montalban and Leo Harrington for numerous helpful comments and
conversations. This work will be part of the author’s Ph.D. thesis [Sch]. The author was partially supported
by Antonio Montalban through NSF grant DMS-0901169.
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Five,” five subtheories of second-order arithmetic — RCA0, WKL0, ACA0, ATR0, and Π
1
1-
CA0 — each of which is “robust,” in the sense that the same theory results when small
changes are made to its exact statement (or to the precise coding mechanisms used), and
which correspond to the exact strength, over RCA0, of the vast majority of theorems studied
by reverse mathematics.
However, there is a significant amount of classical mathematics, including parts of mea-
sure theory and most of general topology, which resists any natural coding into the language
of second-order arithmetic. This was already recognized by Friedman in [Fri75a]. At the
time, the higher-order program failed to draw mathematical attention comparable to that
of second-order reverse mathematics.
Recently, however, there has been a return to this question. The framework of finite
types — in which objects of arbitrary finite order, such as sets of sets of reals, are treated
directly — has begun to emerge as a natural setting for a higher reverse mathematics,
following Ulrich Kohlenbach’s paper on the subject [Koh05].1 Kohlenbach expands the
language of second-order arithmetic to all finite types, and extends the system RCA0 to
include a version of primitive recursion for arbitrary finite-type functionals. The resulting
system, RCAω0 , is a proof-theoretically natural conservative extension of RCA0. (From the
point of view of computability theory, however, the choice of base theory may not be so
clear; see the discussion at the end of this paper.)
Work on reverse mathematics in finite types has so far proceeded along one or the other
of two general avenues: the analysis of classical theorems about objects not naturally
codeable within second-order arithmetic, such as ultrafilters or general topological spaces
([Hun08], [Kre12], [Tow11]), or the analysis of higher-type “uniformizations” of classical
theorems of second-order arithmetic ([Koh05], [SY04]). The present paper instead looks at
the higher-type analogues of theorems studied by classical reverse mathematics, focusing
in particular on what old patterns hold or fail and what new patterns emerge.2 One
natural question in this area is the following: to what extent do the robust subsystems of
second-order arithmetic have robust analogues at higher types?
It is this question which the present paper addresses, focusing on the system ATR0.
In the classical case, much of the robustness of ATR0 comes from the fact that being a
well-ordering is Π11-complete. For instance, this is what drives the method of “pseudo-
hierarchies” by which ill-founded linear orders which appear well-founded, such as those
constructed in [Har68], are used to prove a large number of equivalences at the level of
ATR0; see [Sim99]. Moving up a type, however, changes the situation completely: since
we can code an infinite sequence of reals by a single real, the class of well-orderings of
subsets of R is again Π11, instead of being Π
2
1 complete. This causes the entire method
of pseudohierarchies to break down, and raises doubt that the higher-type analogues of
various theorems classically equivalent to ATR0 are still equivalent.
1Although it is by no means the only one — see [Sho13] for an approach via α-recursion theory instead,
and also [GK13] for a cloesly-related α-recursive structure theory. Shore also suggests other approaches
which could be interesting, such as via E-recursion or the computation theory of Blum-Shub-Smale.
2This is also the approach taken in [Sho13], there with respect to α-recursion rather than finite types.
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We begin by presenting in section 2 a base theory, RCA30, which is simpler to use than
RCAω0 ; in section 4, we show that the two theories are essentially equivalent. We then study
the complexity over RCA30 of several higher-type analogues of several principles classically
equivalent to ATR0: comparability of well-orderings, arithmetic bar recursion over a well-
founded tree, arithmetic transfinite recursion along an ordinal, clopen determinacy, open
determinacy, and Σ11 separation. In section 2, we show that these principles are almost
linearly ordered in terms of strength; the exceptions are due to the need for choice principles
when working with higher-type objects, in particular, that the reals are well-orderable and
that selection functions for appropriate collections of sets of reals exist. At the bottom
of this hierarchy lies the principle asserting the comparability of well-orderings of sets of
reals, which we show is remarkably weak at higher types relative to the other principles; at
the top, a higher-type version of the separation principle Σ11-Sep. We also show that the
choice principles mentioned above are incomparable.
The main result of this paper, to which section 3 is devoted, concerns the two deter-
minacy principles. In classical reverse mathematics, clopen determinacy fails in HYP, the
model consisting of the hyperarithmetic sets, despite hyperarithmetic clopen games hav-
ing hyperarithmetic winning strategies, since the method of pseudohierarchies allows us
to construct games which are “hyperarithmetically clopen” but are undetermined in HYP.
This method, as noted above, is no longer valid at higher types, while the complexities of
winning strategies for clopen games on reals can still be bounded by a transfinite iteration
of an appropriate jump-like operator. This suggests that at higher types, open determinacy
becomes strictly stronger than clopen determinacy; using an uncountable version of Steel’s
tagged tree forcing, we show that this is indeed the case.
The reverse-mathematical results of this paper are summarized in the diagram below:
Σ21-Sep
R + SF(R)

ΣR1 -Det

TR1(R) +WO(R) + SF(R) // ∆
R
1 -Det

oo // BR1(R) + SF(R)
CWOR
Finally, we end by presenting several open questions and directions for further research,
raised by both the specific material in this paper and the general program of higher-type
reverse mathematics.
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1.1. Background and Conventions. We refer the reader to [Kun83] for the relevant
background in set theory; for descriptive set theory, [Mos09] and [Kec95] are the standard
sources. For background on reverse mathematics, see [Sim99]. Finally, for background in
finite types, as well as the various computability-theoretic concerns which arise in higher-
type settings, see [Lon05].
There are several notational conventions we adopt for simplicity. Throughout, we use
R to refer to the Baire space, the set of functions from ω to ω; this is because, during the
main result, ordinals will be used as tags, and for this reason a symbol other than “ωω” is
preferable. If σ is a nonempty finite string, we write σ− for the immediate 4-predecessor
of σ, and if f is an infinite string we write f− for the string n 7→ f(n+ 1).
When writing formulas in many-sorted logic, we use the convention that the first time
a variable occurs it is decorated with the appropriate sort symbol; for example,
∃x1∀y0(xy = 2)
is the statement “There is a function from naturals to naturals which is identically 2.” (See
section 2.1 for a discussion of types.)
If ϕ is a sentence, then JϕK is the truth value of ϕ: 1 if ϕ holds, and 0 if ϕ does not. We
denote the constant map k 7→ 0 by 0.
If Σ,Π: A<ω → A, we write Σ ⊗ Π for the element of Aω built by alternately applying
Σ and Π:
Σ⊗Π = 〈Σ(〈〉),Π(〈Σ(〈〉)〉),Σ(〈Σ(〈〉),Π(〈Σ(〈〉)〉)〉), ...〉.
We write (Σ⊗Π)k for the length-k initial segment of Σ⊗Π. A game is said to be a win for
player X if that player has a winning strategy. A quasistrategy for a game played on a set
A (so, viewed as a subtree of A<ω) is a multi-valued map from A<ω to A; a quasistrategy
is said to be winning if each element of Aω which is compatible with the quasistrategy is
a win for the corresponding player.
Finally, Theorems 2.14 and 3.5 rely heavily on the method of set-theoretic forcing. For
completeness, we present here a brief summary of this method; for details and proofs, see
chapter VII of[Kun83].
Given a model V of ZF and a poset P ∈ V , a filter is a subset F of P which is closed
upwards, and such that any two elements of F have a common lower bound in F ; a set
D ⊆ P is dense if every element of P has a lower bound in D. The P-names are defined
inductively to be the sets {(pi, γi) : i ∈ I} of pairs with first coordinate an element of
the partial order P, and second coordinate a P-name. If G is a filter meeting every dense
subset of P which is in V — that is, G is P-generic over V — and γ is a P-name, we let
γ[G] = {θ[G] : ∃p ∈ G((p, θ) ∈ γ)} (this is of course a recursive definition). Crucially, the
definition of γ[G] is made inside V , although G will itself will never be in V .
We then define the generic extension of V by G to be
V [G] = {γ[G] : γ is a P-name in V }.
If V [G] |= ϕ whenever p ∈ G, we write p  ϕ; the relation  is the forcing relation given by
P. The essential properties of set-theoretic forcing are that the generic extension V [G] is a
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model of ZF, and satisfies AC if V does; that the forcing relation is definable in the ground
model; and that any statement true in the generic extension is forced by some condition
in the generic filter. These are Theorems VII.4.2, VII.3.6(1), and VII.3.6(2) of [Kun83],
respectively.
We will also use the following observation of Fuchs [FHR11] (although we will only need
the direction (1) =⇒ (2)) :
Definition 1.1. A forcing notion P is countably closed if given any decreasing ω-sequence
of conditions
p0 ≥ p1 ≥ ...
there is some common extension ∈ P such that
q ≤ pi, ∀i.
Fact 1.2. Let V |=ZF. Then the following are equivalent:
(1) V |=DC.
(2) Whenever Q ∈ V is countably closed in V , forcing with Q adds no new countable
sets of ordinals; in particular, forcing with Q adds no new reals.
Both forcings considered in this paper are countably closed.
2. Reverse mathematics beyond type 1
In this section we first (2.1) review the framework of reverse mathematics in higher
types; then (2.2) we define the various higher-type versions of ATR0 we will consider in
this paper, and prove some basic separations and equivalences. We conclude with Theorem
2.14, whose proof is similar in spirit to, yet much simpler than, that of our main theorem,
3.5.
2.1. The base theory. We begin by making precise the notion of a finite type.3
Definition 2.1. The finite types are defined as follows:
• 0 is a finite type;
• if σ, τ are finite types, then so is σ → τ ; and
• only something required to be a finite type by the above rules is a finite type.
We denote the set of all finite types by FT .
The intended interpretation of finite types is as a hierarchy of functionals, with type 0
representing the “atomic” objects — here, natural numbers, or more generally elements
of some first-order model of an appropriate theory of arithmetic — and type σ → τ
3The one oddity of working with types is that the natural formalization is via many-sorted first-order
logic, as opposed to ordinary first-order logic. In many-sorted logic, each element of the model and each
variable symbol is labelled by one of a fixed collection of sorts; similarly, function, constant, and relation
symbols in the signature must be appropriately labelled with sorts. When there are infinitely many sorts
— as is the case with Kohlenbach’s RCAω0 , but not our RCA
3
0 — the resulting logic is subtlely different
from single-sorted first-order logic; however, these differences shall not be relevant here. For a careful
introduction to many-sorted logic, see Chapter VI of [Man96
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representing the set of maps from the set of objects of type σ to the set of objects of type
τ .
Within the finite types is the special subclass ST of standard finite types, defined in-
ductively as follows: 0 is a standard type, and if σ is a standard type, then so is σ → 0.
The standard types are for simplicity identified with natural numbers: 0 → 0 is denoted
by “1,” (0→ 0)→ 0 by “2,” etc.
The appeal of the finite-type framework to reverse mathematics is extremely compelling:
the use of finite types lets us talk directly about objects that previously required extensive
coding to treat in reverse mathematics, or could not be treated at all. For example,
a topological space with cardinality ≤ ii (where i0 = ℵ0,ii+1 = 2
ii) can be directly
represented as a pair of functionals (F i, Gi+1) corresponding to the characteristic functions
of the underlying set and the collection of open subsets. Usually, this representation is even
natural. In [Koh05], Kohlenbach developed a base theory for reverse mathematics in all
the finite types at once, RCAω0 .
However, working with all finite types at once is cumbersome. First, morally speaking, all
finite-type functionals are equivalent to functionals of finite standard type via appropriate
pairing functions; second, arbitrarily high types are rarely directly relevant. For that
reason, we will use a base theory RCA30, defined below, which only treats functionals of
types 0, 1, and 2. In section 4, we prove that the base theory we use in this paper and
Kohlenbach’s base theory RCAω0 are equivalent in a precise sense.
Definition 2.2. L3 is the many-sorted first order language, consisting of the following:
• Sorts s0, s1, s2, with corresponding equality predicates =0,=1,=2. We will identify
sort si with type i; recall that the objects of type 0, 1, and 2 are intended to be
natural numbers, reals, and maps from reals to naturals, respectively.
• On the sort s0, the usual signature of arithmetic: two binary functions
+,× : s0 × s0 → s0,
a binary relation
<⊆ s0 × s0,
and two constants
0, 1 ∈ s0.
• Application operators ·0, ·1 with
·0 : s1 × s0 → s0, ·1 : s2 × s1 → s0.
These operators will generally be omitted; e.g., Fx or F (x) instead of F ·1 x or
·1(F, x).
• A binary operation
∗ : s2 × s1 → s1
and a binary operation
a : s0 × s1 → s1.
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The additional operations ∗ and a allow coding which in Kohlenbach’s setting is handled
through functionals of non-standard type. Axioms which completely determine ∗ and a
are given in Definition 2.3, below. We will abuse notation slightly and use a to denote
both the concatenation of strings, and the specific L3-symbol, as no confusion will arise.
Throughout this paper, “L3-term” will mean “L3-term with parameters.”
Finally, the syntactic classes Σ0i and Π
0
i are defined for L
3 as follows:
• A formula ϕ is in Σ00 if and only if it has only bounded quantifiers over type 0
objects and no occurrences of =1 or =2. (Note that arbitrary parameters, however,
are allowed.)
• A formula ϕ is in Π0i+1 if
ϕ ≡ ∀x0θ(x),
where θ ∈ Σ0i .
• A formula ϕ is in Σ0i+1 if
ϕ ≡ ∃x0θ(x),
where θ ∈ Π0i .
The higher syntactic classes Σ1i , Σ
2
j , etc. are defined in the analogous way, with lower-
type quantifiers being “for free” as usual.
The base theory for third-order reverse mathematics which we will use in this paper,
RCA30, is then defined as follows:
Definition 2.3. RCA30 is the L
3-theory consisting of the following axioms:
• Σ01-induction and the ordered semiring axioms, P
−, for the type 0 objects.
• Extensionality axioms for the type 1 and 2 objects:
∀F 1, G1(∀x0(Fx = Gx) ⇐⇒ F =1 G) and ∀F
2, G2(∀x1(Fx = Gx) ⇐⇒ F =2 G)
• The ∆01 comprehension
4 schemes for type 1 and 2 objects:
{∀x0∃!y0ϕ(x, y) =⇒ ∃f1∀x0(ϕ(x, f(x))) : ϕ ∈ Σ01}
and
{∀x1∃!y0ϕ(x, y) =⇒ ∃F 2∀x1(ϕ(x, F (x))) : ϕ ∈ Σ01}.
(The notation “∃!” is shorthand for “there exists exactly one.”) Recall that Σ01
formulas may have arbitrary parameters.
• Finally, the following axioms defining ∗ and a:
∀k0, r1, n0[(kar)(n+ 1) = r(n) ∧ (kar)(0) = k],
and
∀F 2, r1, k0[(F ∗ r)(k) = F (kar)].
The first of these axioms just says that a is the usual concatenation operation; the
second is less intuitive, but describes a precise way to turn type-2 functionals into
type-(1→ 1) functionals.
4There are several equivalent formulations of these, including as choice principles; we choose the following
presentation, as it is closest to the ∆01 comprehension principle of RCA
ω
0 .
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Note that if (M0,M1,M2; ∗0,
a
0), (M0,M1,M2; ∗1,
a
1) |=RCA
3
0, then in fact
(M0,M1,M2; ∗0,
a
0) = (M0,M1,M2; ∗1,
a
1);
that is, models of RCA30 are determined by their 0-, 1-, and 2-type objects, and it is
enough to specify these types to specify the full model. Despite this, the symbols a and ∗
are necessary for RCA30 since we avoid nonstandard finite types. As evidence of this, the
following two facts are easy to prove, yet crucially rely on comprehension over ∆01 formulas
involving a and ∗:
Fact 2.4. RCA30 proves each of the following statements:
(1) For each type-2 functional F , there is a real r such that
∀s1, n0[∀k0(s(k) = n) =⇒ r(n) = F (s)].
(2) For each type-2 functional F , there is a type-2 functional G such that
G(〈a0, a1, a2, ..., an, ...〉) = F (〈a0, a2, a4, ..., a2n, ...〉)
Proof. For (1), first note that the type-2 comprehension scheme gives us a functional I
such that ∀r1[I(r) = r(1)], and hence
∀r1, k0[∀i0(I ∗ (kar)(i) = k)].
Now our desired real r can be defined by
r(k) = F (I ∗ (ka0)),
which exists by the type-1 comprehension scheme.
For (2), let H be the type-2 functional defined by the quantifier-free formula H(r) =
r(2r(0) + 1); then the desired G is defined by the quantifier-free formula
G(r) = k ⇐⇒ F (H ∗ r) = k,
and so again is guaranteed to exist by the type-1 comprehension scheme. 
It can be shown that neither (1) nor (2) is provable if we restrict the ∆01 comprehension
schemes to formulas not involving ∗ and a. Essentially, ∗ and a are the price we pay for
having axioms which closely resemble those of RCA0 and simple models of our base theory.
To drive this last point home, we end this section by presenting some natural models of
RCA30:
Example 2.5. Let I be a Turing ideal. Then the smallest ω-model of RCA30 containing
each real in I is
SI = (ω,I, {r 7→ ϕ
r⊕s
e (0) : s ∈ I, ϕ
r⊕s
e total for every r ∈ I}).
Example 2.6. Let
C = (ω,R, {F : R→ ω : F is continuous}), B = (ω,R, {F : R→ ω : F is Borel}).
Both C and B are models of RCA30. In both cases, the key step is the observation that
F0 ∗ (F1 ∗ ... ∗ (Fn ∗ r)) = (Fˆ0 ◦ Fˆ1 ◦ ... ◦ Fˆn)(r)
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(where Fˆ : r 7→ 〈F (0ar), F (1ar), ...〉), and F is continuous/Borel as a function from R to
ω iff Fˆ is continuous/Borel as a function from R to R. This, and the closure of continu-
ous/Borel functions under composition, lets us show that functions of the form
x 7→ JF0 ∗ (F1 ∗ (... ∗ (Fn ∗ x)))(i) = kK
are continuous/Borel so long as their parameters are, which in turn provides the base case
for the induction showing ∆01-comprehension for type-2 objects holds in C/B.
We will use both C and B in separations in the following subsection (2.13 and 2.12,
respectively).
2.2. Higher-type analogues of ATR0. In what follows, we treat higher-type determi-
nacy principles, and towards that end some definitions are necessary. There are several
reasonable ways to encode game trees ⊆ R<ω as type-2 functionals, and the specific choice
of coding is unimportant. When discussing plays, however, things become more compli-
cated. If Σ,Π are strategies, then the kth stage in the play Σ⊗Π, (Σ⊗Π)k — or rather,
a real coding (Σ ⊗ Π)k — is defined as follows. There is a functional F , whose existence
is guaranteed by the comprehension scheme, such that F ∗ (kar) is the kth “row” of r;
specifically, F is defined by
s 7→ s(2 + 〈s(0), s(1)〉).
We say that a real r codes (Σ⊗Π)k if
• F ∗ (0ar) = 0,
• ∀0 < 2j + 1 ≤ k[F ∗ ((2j + 1)ar) = Σ ∗ (F ∗ ((2j)ar))], and
• ∀0 < 2j + 2 ≤ k[F ∗ ((2j + 2)ar) = Π ∗ (F ∗ ((2j + 1)ar))];
similarly, we say that r codes the whole play Σ ⊗ Π if r codes (Σ ⊗ Π)k for all k. This
definition lets us refer to the play Σ ⊗ Π inside the language of RCA30; and we use, e.g.,
“(Σ ⊗Π)k 6∈ T” as shorthand for “there is a real r coding (Σ⊗Π)k, and r 6∈ T .”
There is a subtlety here, which arises due to a particular weakness in the base theory
RCAω0 (and hence RCA
3
0). (The end of this paper addresses the foundational aspects of this;
for now, we simply treat it as it affects us.) RCA30 is too weak to guarantee the existence
of such a real. This is a consequence of Hunter’s proof ([Hun08], Theorem 2.5) that the
theory
RCA30+E1 := RCA
3
0+“∃E
2∀x1(Ex = 0 ⇐⇒ ∀k0(xk = 0))”
is conservative over ACA0: if Σ and Π are each the operator E described above, then the
sentence asserting that (Σ⊗Π)k always exists implies ACA
+
0 , so that sentence cannot be a
consequence of RCA30+E1.
This can be salvaged in general by altering the base theory; and in fact, since this same
subtlety arises in other ways, this is a reasonable course of action — see the end of Section
5 of this paper. In our case, however, all potential difficulties are handled by the strength of
the principles we consider. For example, in the definition of clopen and open determinacy,
we use a positive definition of “winning strategy:” for example, a strategy Σ for Open in
an open game is winning if for every strategy Π for Closed, there is a real coding some
fragment (Σ⊗Π)k by which Σ has won. This builds into the statements of the theorems we
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examine all the strength we need to perform the intuitively natural calculations involving
stages of games.
The end result is that, although we cannot meaningfully talk about the play of a game
Σ⊗Π directly within RCA30, the principles we study in this paper happen to have enough
power to allow us to do so. As an example of this, it is easy to see that each of the principles
defined in Definition 2.7 below imply that at most one player has a winning strategy in an
open or clopen game; however, this is not provable in the base theory RCA30 alone.
Consider the following four theorems, all equivalent to ATR0 over RCA0:
• Comparability of well-orderings: If X,Y are well-orders with domain ⊆ N, then
there is an embedding from one into the other.
• Clopen determinacy: Every well-founded subtree of ω<ω, viewed as a clopen game,
is determined.
• Open determinacy: Every subtree of ω<ω, viewed as an open game, is determined.
• Σ11 separation: If ϕ(A) is a Σ
1
1 sentence (possibly with parameters) with a single
free set variable, and X = (Xi)i∈ω is an array of sets such that
∀k ∈ ω∃j ∈ 2(¬ϕ(X〈k,j〉)),
then there is some set Y such that
∀k ∈ ω(¬ϕ(X〈k,Y (k)〉)).
These each have reasonable higher-type analogues, each of which is a theorem of ZFC:
Definition 2.7. Over RCA30, we define the following principles:
• The comparability of well-orderings of reals, CWOR: If X,Y are well-orderings with
domain ⊆ R, then there is an embedding from one into the other.
• Clopen determinacy for reals, ∆R1 -Det: for every tree T ⊆ R
<ω which is well-
founded, viewed as a clopen game, either there is a winning strategy for player
I:
∃Σ: R<ω → R,∀Π: R<ω → R[∃k ∈ ω((Σ ⊗Π)2k+1 ∈ T ∧ (Σ⊗Π)2k+2 6∈ T )];
or there is a winning strategy for player II:
∃Π: R<ω → R,∀Σ: R<ω → R[∃k ∈ ω((Σ ⊗Π)2k ∈ T ∧ (Σ⊗Π)2k+1 6∈ T )].
• Open determinacy for reals, ΣR1 -Det: for every tree T ⊆ R
<ω, viewed as an open
game, either there is a winning strategy for player I (Open):
∃Σ: R<ω → R,∀Π: R<ω → R[∃k ∈ ω((Σ⊗Π)k 6∈ T )];
or there is a winning strategy for player II (Closed):
∃Π: R<ω → R,∀Σ: R<ω → R[∀k ∈ ω((Σ⊗Π)k ∈ T )].
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• The Σ21-separation principle, Σ
2
1-Sep
R: If ϕ(f2) is a Σ21-formula with a single type-2
free variable, and X = (Xη)η∈R, Y = (Yη)η∈R are real-indexed collections of type-2
functionals5 such that
¬∃x1(ϕ(Xx) ∧ ϕ(Yx)),
then there is some type-2 object F such that
∀x1[ϕ(Xx) =⇒ F (x) = 1 and ϕ(Yx) =⇒ F (x) = 0].
(Note that, strictly speaking, Σ21-Sep
R is an infinite scheme, as opposed to a single
sentence.) It is these principles which we choose to study in this paper. The remainder of
this section is devoted to the simpler parts of their analysis; the separation of clopen and
open determinacy for reals is the subject of the following section.
Note that the determinacy principles above are not provable in ZF alone, whereas
CWORand Σ21-Sep
R are, so in order to analyze these principles properly we need some
versions of the axiom of choice. The two most important ways choice shows up is in tak-
ing the Kleene-Brouwer ordering of a well-founded subtree of R<ω and in passing from a
quasistrategy for a game on reals to an actual strategy. These correspond, respectively, to
the following two principles:
Definition 2.8. Letting 〈·, ·〉 be an appropriate pairing function on R, the well-ordering
and selection principles for R are the following:
• WO(R) is the statement that R is well-ordered by some functional; that is, there is
some type-2 functional F such that the relation
{(a, b) : F (〈a, b〉) = 1}
is a well-ordering of R.
• SF(R) is the statement that every R-indexed set of nonempty sets of reals has a
selection functional; that is, for every type-2 functional F — interpreted as the
R-indexed set of reals
{{s ∈ R : F (〈r, s〉) = 1} : r ∈ R}
— there is a type-2 functional G satisfying
∀r1(F (〈r,G ∗ r〉) = 1).
Now we turn to the implications:
5A real-indexed set of type-2 functionals (Zs)s∈R is coded by the type-2 functional
Zˆ : r 7→ ZP0∗r(P1 ∗ r),
where P0, P1 correspond to the left and right projections of a reasonable pairing function R
2 ∼= R.
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Fact 2.9. Over RCA30, we have
ΣR1 -Det =⇒ ∆
R
1 -Det
and
Σ21-Sep
R + SF(R) =⇒ ΣR1 -Det.
Proof. The first implication is trivial. For the second implication, suppose Σ21-Sep
R
holds, and let T ⊆ N<ω be a tree, viewed as an open game (with Open playing first). We
will show T is determined.
Let
Gσ =
{
{τ : σaτ ∈ T}, |σ| = 2k,
{τ : σaτ− ∈ T}, |σ| = 2k + 1.
Note that Gσ is a win for Open if and only if σ as a node on T is winning for Open; this is
the reason for the extra “padding” move in the case that |σ| is odd. Fixing some reasonable
pairing mechanism, let
Hσ = 〈0, Gσ〉 and Jσ = 〈1, Gσ〉.
Let ϕ be the formula
[∃σ ∈ T (f = 〈0, Gσ〉∧ G is a win for Closed)]∨[∃σ ∈ T (f = 〈1, Gσ〉∧ G is a win for Open)].
We will see that ϕ can be expressed in a Σ21 way.
First we show how this will prove that T is determined. Note that for a given σ, we
cannot have ϕ(Hσ) and ϕ(Jσ) both hold, so we can apply Σ
2
1-Sep
R (after some appropriate
coding). This gives a map
ev : T → {Closed,Open}.
From this map — and SF (N ) — we can define a winning strategy for T : let Σopen and
Σclosed be the strategies for Open and Closed, respectively, which act by selecting (if pos-
sible, and playing some fixed real otherwise) an extension to a node on T labelled Open or
Closed, respectively. It is easy to check that one of these strategies must be winning.
Now to see that ϕ is Σ21, observe that saying that a game is a win for Open (or Closed,
identically) is the same as saying that there is some strategy for Open which defeats all
plays. On the face of it this is Σ22, but each play is just an ω-sequence of reals, and so can
be coded as a single real; and now the statement is clearly Σ21. It follows that ϕ, as the
disjunction of two Σ21 statements, is Σ
2
1. 
The next implications concern ∆R1 -Det, and demonstrate its closeness in spirit to the
classical second-order system ATR0:
Definition 2.10. We define the following two choiceless versions of ∆R1 -Det:
• BR1(R) (bar recursion) is the statement that for any well-founded tree T ⊆ R
<ω,
there is a type-2 functional h such that ran(h) ⊆ {0, 1} and for all σ ∈ T , we have
h(σ) = 0 ⇐⇒ ∀a1(σa〈a〉 ∈ T =⇒ h(σa〈a〉) = 1).
(Here we assume some natural coding of elements of R<ω by elements of R, so
expressions such as h(σ) make sense.)
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• TR1(R) (transfinite recursion) is the scheme of statements asserting that Σ
1
1 formu-
las can be iterated along arbitrary well-orderings of sets of reals. More precisely, let
W be a well-ordering of a set dom(W ) of reals,6 and let ϕ(x1, Y 2) be a Σ11 formula
with the displayed free variables. Then TR1(R) includes the axiom
∃X2∀a1(a ∈ dom(W ) =⇒ X [a] ≡ “b1 7→ Jϕ(b,X [<W a])K”),
where the functionals X [a] and X [<W a] are appropriate codings of the ath column
and all columns <X-prior to the ath column of W , respectively.
Unlike ∆R1 -Det, both TR1(R) and BR1(R) are provable in ZF. TR1(R) is the closest direct
analogue of ATR0, but it also suffers most from the ineffectiveness of the axiom of choice:
classically, one passes from transfinite recursion to bar recursion via the Kleene-Brouwer
ordering, but taking the Kleene-Brouwer ordering of a subtree of R<ω requires a well-
ordering of R. BR1(R) provides a nice middle ground between determinacy and transfinite
recursion, and in fact captures exactly the choiceless part of ∆R1 -Det.
Lemma 2.11. Over RCA30:
(i) ∆R1 -Det proves TR1(R) + SF(R).
(ii) ∆R1 -Det and BR1(R) + SF(R) are equivalent.
(iii) TR1(R) +WO(R) + SF(R) proves ∆
R
1 -Det.
Proof. For (i), we have ∆R1 -Det =⇒ SF(R) easily: given an R-indexed collection of sets
of reals, consider the game where player I plays an element of R, and player II then has
to play an element of the corresponding set of reals. A winning strategy for this game is
exactly the necessary selection function.
Now let W be a well-ordering of a set dom(W ) of reals, and let ϕ(x1, Y 2) be a Σ11
formula in the displayed free variables. It is easily checked that RCA30 proves the following
countable dependence condition: that for each a1, B2, if ϕ(a,B) holds then there is a
sequence C = (ci)i∈ω of reals
7 such that
∀D2[∀i0(D(ci) = B(ci)) =⇒ ϕ(a,D)].
This lets us define the following clopen game: player I plays a real a0, and player II
decides whether that real is in the iteration set X required in the definition of TR1(R).
If player II claims that a0 is in X, then they have to also supply the values of X on a
countable set of reals belonging to columns strictly W -below the column of a0; if they
claim that a0 is not in X, then player I must play such a set. Whichever player did not
play the ensuring set, must challenge; this takes the form of asserting that some real a1
is or is not in X, where a1 belongs to a W -smaller column than a0. A countable set of
reals must then be supplied by whichever player claimed a1 is in X, and so forth. The first
player to be unable to make a legal move, or to play a countable set of reals which do not,
in fact, guarantee that some fixed real is in X, loses. This is easily checked to be a clopen
6More precisely, we let W be a type-2 functional with range ⊆ 3, such that W (〈a, b〉) = 0 if a <W b, 1
if b ≤W a, and 2 if ¬(a, b ∈ dom(W )).
7Formally, C is a type-2 functional F , and ci is shorthand for F ∗ (i
a0).
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game, which player I cannot win; and it follows that any winning strategy computes the
desired X.
For (ii), given a clopen game G, use BR1(R) with the formula
ϕ(A2) ≡ ∃a1(A(a) = 0).
The resulting function h then computes a winning quasistrategy for G: if h(σ) = 0, then
σ is a loss for whoever’s turn it is, and one player or the other can win by ensuring that
their opponent always plays from nodes marked 0 by h. SF(R) then lets us pass from this
winning quasistrategy to a geniune winning strategy.
In the other direction, given a well-founded T and a formula ϕ, consider the following
well-founded game. First, player I chooses some σ ∈ T ; then, player II responds by playing
either “Safe” or “Unsafe.” The game then continues by playing the clopen game Tσ, with
player II going first if she chose “Safe” and player II going second if she chose “Unsafe.”
Clearly only player II can have a winning strategy, and any winning strategy computes the
desired h by setting h(σ) = 0 if the winning strategy for II tells II to play “Unsafe” if I
plays σ.
For (iii), the proof is basically the same as (ii), with one slight change: given a clopen
game T , we use WO(R) to form the Kleene-Brouwer ordering of T . Then TR1(R) can be
applied, similarly to the use of BR1(R) above, to get a winning quasistrategy for T ; finally,
we use SF(R) to pass to a genuine winning strategy. 
We now move on to the separations. Among the various forms of ATR0, there is one
particular separation which is straightforward, which we present now. Given the low com-
plexity of wellfoundedness at higher types, it is reasonable to expect that CWOR is quite
weak relative to the higher-type determinacy principles. This is, in fact, true:
Lemma 2.12. Let B be the model generated by the Borel sets, as in Example 2.6. Then
B |= CWOR + ¬∆R1 -Det.
Proof. Any uncountable Borel set of reals contains a perfect subset, and there is no
Borel well-ordering of R. These facts follow from Borel determinacy ([Kec95], Theorem
20.5), and together imply that all Borel well-orderings are countable. It then follows that
any two Borel well-orderings are comparable by a Σ0
2
embedding, so B |= CWOR.
To show that B |= ¬∆R1 -Det, fix some Σ
1
1
set X ⊆ R which is not Borel. Let T ⊆ ω<ω
be a tree such that
X = {a ∈ R : ∃b ∈ R((〈a(i), b(i)〉)i∈ω ∈ [T ])};
such a tree is guaranteed to exists since X is Σ11. Now consider the game in which player I
plays a real a, player II guesses whether a is in X, and then the appropriate player (I if II
said no, II if II said yes) plays a real b and wins if and only if b is a witness to a being in
X. This is a clopen game, and viewed as a subtree of R<ω it is clearly Borel, and hence in
B; but if B has a winning strategy for this game, then B must contain X, contradicting
the assumption that X is not Borel. 
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Note that Borel instances of ∆R1 -Det can be constructed whose winning strategies are
much more complex than Σ11; so CWO
R is in fact far weaker than ∆R1 -Det.
Finally, we end this section by establishing the incomparability of the choice principles
WO(R) and SF(R).
Lemma 2.13. RCA30+SF(R)6|=WO(R).
Proof. Let C be the set of all continuous functions (in some model of ZFC) from R to
ω; we will see that
C = (ω,R, C) |= RCA30+ SF(R)+ ¬WO(R).
Immediately, we have C |= ¬WO(R), since there is no continuous well-ordering of the
reals; equally immediately, all axioms of RCA30 except the ∆
0
1-comprehension scheme for
type-2 objects hold in C. To show that the comprehension scheme also holds, the key
step is showing that any functional defined by a ∆01-formula with continuous functionals as
parameters is again continuous; this is an easy yet tedious induction on formula complexity,
so we omit it.
Finally, we must show that C satisfies SF(R). To see this, suppose F is an instance of
SF(R), that is, F is a type-2 functional such that for every real a, there is some real b such
that F (〈a, b〉) = 1. Now for a ∈ R, let σa ∈ ω
<ω be the lexicographically least string such
that for all reals aˆ, b, if aˆ ↾ |σa| = a ↾ |σa| and σa ≺ b, then F (aˆ, b) = 1; such a string exists,
since F is continuous and is an instance of SF(R). More importantly, the map a 7→ σa is
continuous. From this, it follows that the function
g : R→ ω : r 7→
{
σr−(r(0)) if r(0) < |σr− |,
0 otherwise.
is continuous and satisfies F (a, g(a)) = 1 for all reals a; so we are done.8 
The other separation is more complicated. To the best of our knowledge, there is no
natural model of WO(R)+¬SF(R) as there is of SF(R)+¬WO(R), so we have to build one.
Towards this end, we begin with an appropriate model W of ZF in which there is no well-
ordering of R, and adjoin a well-ordering of R by forcing. Of course, this also means that in
the generic extension, real-indexed sets of reals have selection functions, so the full model
(ω,R, ωR)W [G] does not separate SF(R) from WO(R). Instead, we look at the restricted
model
(ω,RV , {ν[G] : ν ∈ N})
for a class N of well-behaved names for type-2 functionals, chosen so that the generic well-
ordering of R winds up in the model, but selection functions for real-indexed nonempty sets
of reals do not in general. This is a variation on the basic idea of “symmetric submodels”
which are used to produce models of ZF in which the axiom of choice fails in controlled
8Although this model does have the desired properties, it satisfies SF(R) in a rather unsatisfying way;
a more interesting separating model is given by the projective functions, under appropriate large cardinal
axioms.
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ways (see [Jec03], pp. 221-223). The proof of our main result in the following section is
also a variation on this basic idea.
Theorem 2.14. RCA30+WO(R)6|=SF(R).
Proof. We take as the ground model for our forcing argument some
W |= ZF+DC+“The reals are not well-ordered;”
the equiconsistency of this theory with ZF itself was proved by Feferman [Fef64]. In W , let
P = {p : p is a countable partial injective function from R to ω1}.
First, note that P is indeed countably closed, so the reals in the generic extension are
precisely the reals in W . We will use this implicitly in what follows. For X a set, we
let [X]ω denote the set of countable subsets of X. We now define, for n ∈ ω + 1, the
n-countable names inductively as follows:
• A 0-code is a pair c = (c0, c1), with c0 : R → [R]
ω and c1 : P → ω. If ν is a name
for a map R→ ω and c is a 0-code, we say that c is good for ν if
∀p ∈ P, a ∈ R[c0(a) ⊆ dom(p) =⇒ p  ν(a) = c1(p)].
For q ∈ P, 0-code c is ν-good below q if
∀p ≤ q ∈ P, a ∈ R[c0(a) ⊆ dom(p) =⇒ p  ν(a) = c1(p)].
• Suppose that the set Cn of n-codes has already been defined, as well as the notions
“ν-good” and ν-good below p” for n-codes. An (n + 1)-code is a pair c = (c0, c1)
with c0 : R → [R]
ω and c1 : P → Cn. If ν is a name for a map R → ω and c is an
(n+ 1)-code, we say that c is ν-good if
∀a ∈ R, p ∈ P[c0(a) ⊆ dom(p) =⇒ c1(p) is ν-good below p];
and for q ∈ P, we say that c is ν-good below q if
∀a ∈ R, p ≤ q ∈ P[c0(a) ⊆ dom(p) =⇒ c1(p) is ν-good below p].
• A name ν for a map R→ ω is n-countable if there is some n-code c which is ν-good.
• ν is ω-countable if ν is n-countable for some n ∈ ω.
• Finally, a name µ for a map R→ R is n- or ω-countable if the name ν for the map
r 7→ µ(r−)(r(0)) is n- or ω-countable.
The intuition is that the value of an ω-countable name is determined by conditions
with large enough domains, mostly regardless of where the elements are sent. This could
certainly be pushed past ω, but finite countability is enough for our purposes.
We can now define our target model: Letting G be P-generic over W , we set
M = (ω,RV = RV [G], {ν[G] : ν is ω-countable}).
Finally, we can finish our proof by showing thatM |=RCA30+WO(R)+¬SF(R), as follows:
TRANSFINITE RECURSION IN HIGHER REVERSE MATHEMATICS 17
• M |=WO(R). This is immediate: the canonical name for the well-ordering
≺G= {(a, b) : G(a) < G(b)}
(viewing G as a map R → ω1) is clearly 0-countable, since to determine whether
G(a) < G(b) just depends on G(a) and G(b).
• M 6|=SF(R). Our counterexample is ≺G, defined above. Let ν be n-countable. Fix
p ∈ P; we will find a real a and a condition q ≤ p such that
q  ¬(a ≺G ν(a)).
Let a = sup(dom(p)) + 1, and let pˆ be any condition ≤ p such that a ∈ dom(pˆ)
and G(a) − ran(pˆ) is infinite. By induction on n, we can “fill in” the holes in
ran(pˆ) with the reals required to decide ν(a); that is, we can find qˆ ≤ pˆ such that
sup(ran(qˆ)) = qˆ(a), qˆ  ν(a) = b for some real b, and ran(qˆ) is a proper subset
of qˆ(a). If b ∈ dom(qˆ), we take q = qˆ; if not, we let q be any extension of qˆ with
sup(ran(q)) = q(a) and b ∈ dom(q). Either way, the result is a condition, q, such
that q  ν(a) = b but q(b) < q(a), so ν is not a selection function for ≺G.
• M |=RCA30. All axioms except the ∆
0
1-comprehension scheme for type-2 objects
are trivially satisfied, since M is an ω-model containing all the reals. To show that
the comprehension scheme holds, note that by a straightforward induction, if ν0
and ν1 are m- and n-countable names for maps R → R then the name for their
composition ν0◦ν1 is (m+n)-countable. From this, it immediately follows that any
∆01 expression θ with ω-countable parameters defines an ω-countable functional: let
m be such that all parameters in θ are m-countable, and let k be the length of θ;
then the functional defined by θ is mk-countable.
This completes the proof. 
3. Separating clopen and open determinacy
In this section we construct a model M of RCA30+∆
R
1 -Det+ ¬Σ
R
1 -Det, using a variation
of Steel’s tagged tree forcing; see [Ste78], and also [Mon08] and [Nee11]. Throughout this
section, we work over a transitive ground model V of ZFC+CH.
The basic picture is as follows. Consider the classic clopen game Gα, for α an ordinal, in
which players I and II alternately build decreasing sequences of ordinals less than α, and
the first player whose sequence terminates loses. Clearly player II wins this game, since all
she has to do is consistently play slightly larger ordinals than what player I plays.
Gα :
Player I α0 α1 < α0 · · ·
Player II β0 β1 < β0 · · ·
Now there is a natural open game, Oα, associated to Gα. Oα has the same rules as
Gα, except that on player I’s turn, she can give up and start over, playing an arbitrary
ordinal below α. If she does this, then player II gets to play an arbitrary ordinal below
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α as well. After a restart, play then continues as normal, until player II loses or player
I restarts again. Player I (Open) wins if player II’s sequence ever reaches zero; player II
(Closed) wins otherwise.
Oα :
Player I (Open) α0 α1 · · ·
Player II (Closed) β0 β1 · · ·
(∀i, αi+1 < αi =⇒ βi+1 < βi)
Essentially, Oα is gotten by “pasting together” ω-many copies of Gα, one after the other,
and player II must win all of these clopen sub-games in order to win Oα. This is still a win
for player II, but in a more complicated fashion. In particular, if player II happened to not
be able to directly see the ordinals player I played, but was only able to see the underlying
game tree itself, she would need quite a lot of transfinite recursion to be able to figure out
what move to play next - seemingly more than she would need to win Gα, since there is
much more “noise” in the structure of Oα.
This is essentially the situation we create in the construction below. In a close analogy
with Steel forcing we want to force with appropriate partial maps ⊆ R<ω → ω2×ω2 to get
a “generic copy” G of Oω2 represented on the reals (since we assume CH in V ); then, by
taking the underlying tree of G, we can get an open game, TG, classically equivalent to Oω2
but where the meaning of the moves — i.e., the specific ordinals associated to each play
— is hidden. This isn’t quite right, since for technical reasons we look instead at partial
maps ⊆ R<ω → (ω2 ∪ {∞}) × (ω2 ∪ {∞}), and this corresponds to allowing either player
to play ∞ as long as she hasn’t yet played an ordinal in the same clopen subgame, but the
intuition behind the construction remains the same.
Then, as in Steel forcing, we consider a particular substructure of the full generic exten-
sion; however, the approach we take in defining this substructure is essentially the reverse
of the usual analysis of Steel forcing. Classically, the desired substructure is defined by first
picking out specific elements of the generic extension — usually paths through a certain
tree — and then closing under hyperarithmetic reducibility; the proof then continues by
showing that every element of the resulting model depends only on “bounded” informa-
tion about the generic. In our case, we start at the end, and simply consider the part of
the generic extension depending on the generic in a “bounded” way. This is both clearer
and more flexible a method than the standard approach; also, higher-type analogue of the
hyperarithmetic sets — the so-called “hyperanalytic” sets — is more complicated to work
with. See [Mos67] for a definition of this analogue, as well as an account of some early
difficulties faced in its study.
By carefully choosing the right notion of boundedness, it turns out we can preserve
enough transfinite recursion to get clopen determinacy for reals, ∆R1 -Det, but are still
unable to compute a winnning strategy for TG. One important piece of this picture is
that the game Oω2 , and hence the conditions in the forcing we use, is “locally clopen” in
a precise sense — this turns out to be necessary to prove the analog of Steel’s retagging
lemma for this forcing, without which almost nothing can be proved about the resulting
model. The other key feature is the countable closure of our forcing notion, a feature
necessarily absent in constructions at the second-order level.
TRANSFINITE RECURSION IN HIGHER REVERSE MATHEMATICS 19
The forcing we use in this section is the following:
Definition 3.1. Let ω∗2 = ω2 ∪ {∞}, ordered by taking the usual order on ω2 and setting
∞ > x for all x ∈ ω∗2 (including ∞ > ∞). P is the forcing consisting of all partial maps
p : ⊆ R<ω → ω∗2 × ω
∗
2 satisfying the following conditions, ordered by reverse inclusion:
• dom(p) is a countable subtree of R<ω with p(〈〉) ↓= (∞,∞) (the game starts with
player Open moving, and no meaningful tags);
• σ ∈ dom(p) =⇒ [(|σ| = 2k + 1 ∧ p(σ−)1 = p(σ)1) ∨ (|σ| = 2k ∧ p(σ
−)0 = p(σ)0)]
(player Open is playing p(σ)0, Closed is playing p(σ)1, and on a given turn exactly
one of these values changes); and
• σa〈a, b〉 ∈ dom(p), |σ| = 2k, ∞ 6= p(σ)0 > p(σ
a〈a, b〉)0 =⇒ p(σ)1 > p(σ
a〈a, b〉)1
(as long as player Open has not just played an ∞, or failed to play less than her
previous play, Closed’s next play has to be less than her previous play).
Note that the way this last condition is phrased allows p(σ)1 to be anything when p(σ)0 =
∞, for |σ| = 2k, since we have ∞ >∞. Also, if |σ| = 2k and p(σ−)1 =∞, then p(σ)1 can
be anything.
From this point on, we fix a filter G ⊆ P which is P-generic over V .
The main difference between our forcing P and Steel forcing is that P is countably closed
(see 1.2). The immediate use of countable closure is that it lets us completely control the
type-1 objects in our model; later, we will use countable closure in a more subtle way, to
show that no well-orderings of reals of length ≥ ωV2 are in our model, even though such
well-orderings will exist in the full generic extension (Lemma 3.16).
As with Steel forcing, we have a retagging notion:
Definition 3.2. For p, q ∈ P and α ∈ ω2, we say that q is an α-retagging of p, and write
p ≈α q, if
• dom(p) = dom(q);
• for σ ∈ dom(p), i ∈ 2 we have
p(σ)i < α =⇒ q(σ)i = p(σ)i
and
p(σ)i ≥ α =⇒ q(σ)i ≥ α.
These retagging relations let us define the set of names which depend on the generic in
a “bounded” way:
Definition 3.3. Let ν be a name for a type-2 functional, that is, a map R → ω, and
suppose α ∈ ω2. Then ν is α-stable if for all a ∈ R, k ∈ ω, we have
∀p, q ∈ P[p ≈α q, p  ν(a) = k =⇒ q  ν(a) = k.]
Finally, we can define our desired model:
Definition 3.4. Fix G P-generic over V . M is defined inductively to be the L3-structure
M = (ω,R, {ν[G] : ∃α < ω2(ν is α-stable)}).
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The purpose of this section is to prove
Theorem 3.5. M |=RCA30+∆
R
1 -Det+ ¬Σ
R
1 -Det.
We begin with two simple properties of the model M .
Definition 3.6. TG is the underlying tree of G; that is,
TG = {σ ∈ R
<ω : ∃p ∈ G(σ ∈ dom(p))}.
Fact 3.7. (1) P(ωω) ∩ V ⊂M2.
(2) TG ∈M2.
Proof. (1) follows from the fact that canonical names for sets in V do not depend on
the poset P, and are hence 0-stable. For (2), the only way to force σ 6∈ TG is to have some
p ∈ G, τ ≺ σ such that p(τ)1 = 0, so it follows that the canonical name for TG is 1-stable.

We can now prove the first non-trivial fact about M : that it does not satisfy open
determinacy for reals. Specifically, we will show that TG, viewed as an open game, is
undetermined in M .
The first step is the following:
Lemma 3.8. V [G] |= TG is a win for Closed.
Proof. By a straightforward density argument, ifG is generic, then whenever |σ| = 2k+1,
p ∈ G, and p(σ)1 =∞, there is some q ∈ G and a ∈ R such that q(σ
a〈a〉)1 =∞. It follows
that the strategy
Π(σ) = the ≤W -least a such that ∃p ∈ G(p(σ
a〈a〉)1 =∞)
is winning for Closed. 
The indeterminacy of TG in M then follows from a two-part argument: strategies for
Open can be defeated using 3.8 and the countable closure of P, and stable strategies for
Closed can be defeated by pulling the rug out from under her:
Lemma 3.9. M |= ¬ΣR1 -Det.
Proof. Consider the open game corresponding to TG (in which player I is Open). Recall
that TG is in M and TG is “really” a win for player Closed by 3.7 and 3.8, respectively; we
claim that this game is undetermined in M .
Suppose Σ is a strategy for player Open inM . Consider the tree of game-states “allowed”
by Σ:
AΣ = {σ ∈ TG : ∃Π(σ ≺ Σ⊗Π)}.
Since TG is actually a win for Closed, the tree AΣ must be ill-founded. Let f ∈ V [G] be a
path through TG. Then f ∈ V , since P is countably closed and f can be coded by a single
real. But then within V , we can construct a strategy Π which defeats Σ by playing along
f :
τ ≺ f =⇒ Π(τ) = f(|τ |), τ 6≺ f =⇒ Π(τ) = 0.
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Since Π exists in V , Π ∈M2; so TG is not a win for Open in M .
Now suppose Π is a strategy for player Closed in M , and suppose (towards a contradic-
tion) that
p  ν is a winning strategy in TG
where ν is an α-stable name for Π, α ∈ ω2. We can find
• q ≤ p,
• a ∈ R− {c : 〈c〉 ∈ dom(p)},
• b ∈ R, and
• β > α
such that 〈a, b〉 ∈ dom(q), q(〈a〉) = (β,∞), and q  ν(〈a〉) = b. Now since q ≤ p and p
forces that Π wins, we must have q(〈a, b〉) = (β, γ) with γ > β; so γ > α. But then we can
find a qˆ ≈α q such that qˆ ≤ p and qˆ(〈a, b〉) = (βˆ, γˆ) for some βˆ > γˆ. But then qˆ forces that
there is some finite play extending 〈a, b〉 which is a win for Open; and since every possible
finite play exists in M , this contradicts the assumption that ν was forced to be a name for
a winning strategy. 
To analyzeM further, we require the analogue of Steel’s retagging lemma for our forcing:
Lemma 3.10. (Retagging) Suppose α < ω2 has uncountable cofinality, p ≈α q, r ≤ q,
and γ < α. Then there is some rˆ ≤ p with rˆ ≈γ r.
Proof. The heart of this proof is the realization that conditions in P, though not well-
founded, are “locally well-founded” in a precise sense. Intuitively, when deciding how to
tag a given node of r′, we only need to look at a well-founded piece of the domain of r;
using the ranks of these well-founded pieces as parameters gives us enough “room” for the
natural construction to go through.
Formally, we proceed as follows. Since α has uncountable cofinality, we can find a γ˜ such
that γ < γ˜ < α and γ˜ is larger than every r(σ)i and p(τ)i (i ∈ {0, 1}, σ, τ ∈ R
<ω) which is
less than α.
For σ ∈ dom(r)− dom(p), let
Tσ = {τ : σ
aτ ∈ dom(r) ∧ ∀ρ ≺ τ(|σaρ| odd =⇒ ∞ 6= r(σaρ−)0 > r(σ
aρ)0)}
be the set of ways to extend σ within dom(r) which according to r don’t involve player
Open restarting after σ, and note that for each σ ∈ dom(r) − dom(p) the tree Tσ is well-
founded. Also, let N be the set of nodes of dom(r) that are new (that is, not in dom(p))
but don’t follow any new restarts by player Open:
{σ ∈ dom(r)− dom(p) : ∀τ 4 σ(τ ∈ dom(r)− dom(p), |τ | odd =⇒ r(τ−)0 > r(τ)0 6=∞)}.
The idea is that we really only need to focus on nodes in N : nodes in dom(p) have already
had their tags determined, and nodes not in N ∪ dom(p) will have no constraints on their
tags coming from p at all, since they must follow a restart by Open. In order to define the
value of rˆ on some node σ in N , though, we need an upper bound on how large N is above
σ to keep from running out of ordinals prematurely; this is provided by taking the rank of
Tσ.
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Formally, we build the retagged condition as follows. Recalling that V |=ZFC, fix in V
a well-ordering of R<ω, and via that ordering let rk(S) be the rank of S for S ⊆ R<ω a
well-founded tree. Then we define rˆ as follows:
rˆ(σ) =


↑, if σ 6∈ dom(r),
p(σ), if σ ∈ dom(p),
r(σ), if σ 6∈ (N ∪ dom(p)),
(min{γ˜ + rk(Tσ), r(σ)0}, rˆ(σ
−)1), if σ ∈ N and |σ| is odd,
(rˆ(σ−)0,min{γ˜ + rk(Tσ), r(σ)1}), if σ ∈ N and |σ| is even.
It is readily checked that rˆ ∈ P — the assumption on γ˜ being used here to show that the
coordinates of rˆ are decreasing when the corresponding coordinates of r drop from ≥ α to
< α — and that rˆ ≤ p and rˆ ≈γ r (in fact, rˆ ≈γ˜ r). 
As a straightforward application of the retagging lemma, we can now show that M is a
model of RCA30:
Lemma 3.11. M |= RCA30.
P−, the extensionality axioms, the axioms defining ∗ and a, and comprehension for reals
are all trivially satisfied, the last of these since M contains precisely the reals in V and
V |= ZFC. Only the comprehension scheme for type-2 functionals is nontrivial. We will
prove that arithmetic comprehension for type-2 functionals holds in M , since this proof is
no harder than the proof for ∆01 comprehension.
Let ϕ(X1, y0) be an arithmetic (that is, Σ0n for some n ∈ ω; recall Definition 2.2) formula
such that for each a ∈ R there is precisely one k ∈ ω with
M |= ϕ(a, k).
Since each natural number is definable, we can assume ϕ has no type-0 parameters. Let
(Fi)i<n be the type-2 parameters used in ϕ, let (sj)j<m be the type-1 parameters used in
ϕ, and let νi be an α-ranked name for Fi; since each Fi has a ranked name, and there are
only finitely many Fi, we can find some large enough α < ω2 so that such names exist.
Note that we can work directly with the sj, as opposed to just dealing with their names,
since our forcing adds no new reals.
For a ∈ R, let Ca be a minimal — and hence countable — set of names for reals such
that
• Ca contains a name for a and each sj;
• whenever a name µ is in Ca and k ∈ ω, Ca contains a name ν such that  ν = k
aµ;
and
• whenever µ is in Ca and i < n, Ca contains a name µ
′ such that  µ′ = νi ∗ µ.
Although we have not been completely precise in defining the sets Ca, it is clear that the
definition above is effective in the sense that a suitable set of sets of names {Ca : a ∈ R}
exists in the ground model, V . Basically, Ca is the set of reals which can be built from the
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parameters sj using the functionals Fi and the operations ∗ and
a. Ca is a set of names,
as opposed to a set of reals, since the parameters Fi may not exist in the ground model.
The key fact about Ca is that they determine the truth value of the formula ϕ:
Sublemma 3.12. The truth value of ϕ(a, k) depends only on the values the Fi on the
names in Ca. Formally,
∀µ ∈ Ca∃k ∈ R[(p  µ = k) ∧ (q  µ = k)] =⇒ ∀l ∈ ω[(p  ϕ(a, l)) ⇐⇒ (q  ϕ(a, l))].
Proof of sublemma. To prove this, first write ϕ as a quantifier-free infinitary formula,
with infinite conjunctions and disjunctions in place of universal and existential quantifiers,
respectively.
Our claim now follows by induction on the rank of ϕ viewed as a well-founded tree. The
induction step is clear; for the base case, the only nontrivial piece is showing that the truth
value of a formula of the form
F0 ∗ (F1 ∗ ... ∗ (Fm ∗ a))(x) = y
is determined by the value of the Fi on the (names for) reals in Ca; but this is a straight-
forward induction on m. 
Now let ν be a name for the functional defined by ϕ. We will show that ν is (α + ω1)-
ranked.
Let r ∈ R and p, q ∈ P such that p ≈α+ω1 q and p  ν(r) = k. Let
Dr = {t ∈ P : ∀µ ∈ Cr∃s ∈ R(t  µ = s)}
be the set of conditions which decide the value of each name in Cr. Since Cr is countable,
and P is countably closed, the set Dr is dense. Now suppose towards contradiction that
q 6 ν(r) = k. Then since Dr is dense, we can find some q
′ ≤ q such that
q′ ∈ Dr and q
′  ν(r) = l
for some natural l 6= k. By the retagging lemma, there is some p′ ≤ p such that p′ ≈α q
′;
but since each of the νi are α-ranked, we must have
∀i < n, t ∈ R, µ ∈ Cr[(q
′  µ = t) ⇐⇒ (p′  µ = t)].
But since the truth value of ϕ(r, k) depends only on the values of the Cr, this contradicts
the fact that p′ ≤ p and p  ν(r) = k. 
Showing thatM satisfies clopen determinacy for reals, however, requires a more delicate
proof. Intuitively, given a stable name for a clopen game, we ought to be able to inductively
construct a stable name for a winning (quasi)strategy in that game by just iterating the
retagging lemma in the right way. However, since the rank of a stable name is required
to be < ω2, we cannot iterate the retagging lemma ω2-many times, so we need all clopen
games in M to have rank < ω2. This cannot be derived from the retagging lemma alone;
instead, we need to look at particular subposets of P:
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Definition 3.13. For α < ω2, Pα is the subposet of P defined by
Pα = {p ∈ P : ∀σ ∈ dom(p), i ∈ 2(p(σ)i < α ∨ p(σ)i =∞)}.
Conditions in Pα will turn out to satisfy a slightly stronger retagging property with
respect to ≈α — the projecting lemma, below — than conditions in general, and this will
be used to prove that this forcing adds no stable well-orderings of reals longer than any in
the ground model. Note that this is false for unstable well-orderings; in particular, forcing
with P collapses ω2 in the full generic extension.
Definition 3.14. For p ∈ P, α < ω2, we let the α-projection of p,
pα : dom(p)→ (α ∪ {∞})× (α ∪ {∞}),
be the map given by
∀σ ∈ dom(p), i ∈ 2, pα(σ)i =
{
p(σ)i if p(σ)i < α
∞ otherwise.
Lemma 3.15. (Projecting) For all p ∈ P, α < ω2, we have:
(1) pα ∈ Pα;
(2) pα ≈α p;
(3) p ≤ q =⇒ pα ≤ qα;
(4) |Pα|
V = ℵ1; and
(5) Pα is countably closed.
Proof. For (1), note that since we set ∞ >∞, the map
x 7→
{
x if x < α
∞ otherwise
satisfies x < y ⇐⇒ pi(x) < pi(y). So as long as p is in P, the projection pα will not contain
any illegal instances of the second coordinate increasing (which is the only possible obstacle
to being a condition), and so will also be in P - and clearly if pα ∈ P, then pα ∈ Pα.
(2) and (3) are immediate consequences of (1). Property (3) shows that we can allow
γ = α in the retagging lemma above if p is assumed to be in Pα, and that we can take rˆ to
be in Pα as well in that case.
For (4), note that elements of Pα can be coded by countable subsets of R×ω1; the result
then follows since V |= CH.
Finally, for (5), let (pi)i∈ω be a sequence of conditions in Pα with pi+1 ≤ pi. Then since
P is countably closed, we have some q ∈ P with q ≤ pi for all i ∈ ω; but then q
α ∈ Pα by
(1), and since each pi ∈ Pα, we have p
α
i = pi and hence q
α ≤ pi by (3). 
This lemma helps provide us with explicit upper bounds on the lengths of type-2 well-
orderings in M , via the construction below. We can use this result to provide a bound
on the lengths of well-orderings in M , which in turn allows the induction necessary for
showing clopen determinacy to go through.
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Lemma 3.16. (Bounding) Suppose ν is a stable name for a well-ordering of R (that is,
 ν is a well-ordering of R). Then there is some ordinal λ < ω2 such that
 ν 4 λ.
That is, ω2 is not collapsed in a stable way by forcing with P.
Suppose ν is an α-stable name for a well-ordering of a set of reals. The proof takes place
around the subposet Pα. For a sequence of reals a = 〈a0, ..., an〉 and a condition p ∈ P,
say that p is adequate for a, and write Ad(p, a), if p forces that a is a descending sequence
through ν:
p  a0 >ν ... >ν an.
Note that since ν is α-stable, p is adequate for a if and only if pα is adequate for a, by (2)
of the previous lemma.
In order to bound the size of ν in any generic extension, we create in the ground model
an approximation to the tree of descending sequences through ν, as follows:
Tν = {〈(pi, ai)〉i<n : pi ∈ Pα ∧ ∀i < j < n(pj ≤ pi ∧Ad(pj , 〈a0, ..., ai−1〉))}.
Elements of Tν are potential descending sequences, together with witnesses to their possi-
bility. Now since ν is a name for a well-ordering, we must have that Tν is well-founded.
Otherwise, we would have a sequence of condition/real pairs, 〈(pi, ai)〉i∈ω , which build an
infinite descending sequence through ν, that is,
pi+1 ≤ pi, pi+2  ai >ν ai+1.
But then a common strengthening q ≤ pi, which exists by the countable closure of Pα,
would create an infinite descending chain in ν; and this contradicts the assumption that
 ν is well-founded.
Additionally, |Tν | = ℵ1, since Tν ⊆ (Pα×R)
<ω and |Pα| = ℵ1 by Lemma 3.15(4). Fixing
in V a bijection between ω1 and Tν we can take the Kleene-Brouwer ordering Lν of Tν .
Since Tν is well-founded, this is a well-ordering; below, we will show that in fact
 ν 4 Lν .
Let
KGν = {〈a0, ..., an〉 : a0 >ν[G] ... >ν[G] an}
be the tree of descending sequences through ν[G] in V [G], and fix a well-ordering ≤W of
Pα in V . For a ∈ K
G
ν , we define a condition in Pα by recursion as follows:
h(a) = the ≤W -least p ∈ Pα such that p ≤ h(b) for all b ≺ a and Ad(p, a).
(Note that by the previous lemma and the fact that ν is α-stable, h is defined for all
a ∈ KGν .) An embedding from K
G
ν into Tν can then be defined:
e : KGν → Tν : 〈ai〉i<n 7→ 〈(h(〈a0, ..., ai〉), ai)〉i<n.
It follows that ν[G] 4 Lν , as desired. 
Now we are finally ready to prove that M satisfies clopen determinacy. For simplicity,
this proof is broken into three pieces. First, we show that the rank of a node in a clopen
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game can be determined in an α-stable way, for appropriately large α. Then we define a set
which encodes the rank of nodes in a clopen game, as well as which player these nodes are
winning for, and show that this set is similarly well-behaved. Finally, we use this to give
stable names for winning strategies in clopen games which themselves have stable names
— and this will suffice to show that ∆R1 -Det holds in M . Unfortunately, the first two steps
in this proof is exceedingly tedious, as we require more and more room to retag conditions,
but the intuition is that of a straightforward induction.
Fix in V a well-ordering ≤W of R. Using this well-ordering, we can define the rank
rk(T ) of a well-founded tree T ⊂ R<ω in the usual way; and for σ ∈ T , we let rkT (σ) =
rk({τ : σaτ ∈ T}). If ν is a name for a well-founded tree, then rk(ν) and rkν(σ) are the
standard names for rk(ν[G]) and rkν[G](σ).
Lemma 3.17. Let ν be a β-stable name for a well-founded subtree of R<ω, p ∈ P, γ < ω2,
and σ ∈ R<ω such that
p  rkν(σ) = γ,
and suppose q ≈β+ω1(γ2+2) p; then
q  rkν(σ) = γ.
Proof. By induction on γ. For γ = 0, suppose q is a counterexample to the claim; then
we can find r ≤ q and a ∈ R such that
r  σa〈a〉 ∈ ν.
Now by the retagging lemma, we can find some rˆ ≤ p such that rˆ ≈β r. Since ν is β-stable,
we have
r  σa〈a〉 ∈ ν,
which contradicts the assumption on p.
Now suppose the lemma holds for all γ < θ, and let p  rkν(σ) = θ; then
p  ∀a ∈ R(σa〈a〉 ∈ ν =⇒ rkν(σ
a〈a〉) < θ).
Suppose towards a contradiction that
q ≈β+ω1(θ2+2) p and q 6 rkν(σ) = θ;
then there is some r ≤ q, a ∈ R such that
r  σa〈a〉 ∈ ν ∧ rkν(σ
a〈a〉) ≥ θ.
By the retagging lemma we get some rˆ ≤ p such that rˆ ≈β+ω1(θ2+1) r, and since ν is
β-stable we have rˆ  σa〈a〉 ∈ ν. Since rˆ ≤ p, and p  rkν(σ) = θ, we must be able to
find some δ < θ and s ≤ rˆ such that s  rkν(σ
a〈a〉) = δ; using the retagging lemma a
second time, we can get some sˆ ≤ r such that sˆ ≈β+ω1(δ2+2) s. But then by the induction
hypothesis s  rkν(σ
a〈a〉) = δ, contradiction the assumption on r. 
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Definition 3.18. If T ⊂ R<ω is a well-founded tree, thought of as a clopen game, a node
σ on T is safe if the corresponding clopen game
T σ = {τ : σaτ ∈ T}
is a win for player I. For ν be a β-stable name for a well-founded subtree of R<ω with rank
< α for some α < ω2 (see Lemma 3.16), let ∆ν be a name for the set which encodes rank
and safety of nodes on ν:
∆ν [G] := {(σ, δ, i) : σ ∈ ν[G] and rkν[G](σ) = δ and i = Jσ is safe in ν[G]K}.
We will show that ∆ν is well-behaved, in the sense of stability, and use this to give a
stable name for a winning strategy for ν.
Lemma 3.19. Let ν be a β-stable name for a well-founded subtree of R<ω of rank < α;
and for simplicty, let κ = β + ω1(α2 + 2). If p  (σ, δ, i) ∈ ∆ν, and q ≈κ+ω1(δ2+2) p, then
q  (σ, δ, i) ∈ ∆ν.
Proof. Suppose not. Let δ be the least ordinal such that for some σ, i there are conditions
p, q such that
• q ≈κ+ω1(δ2+2) p,
• p  (σ, δ, i) ∈ ∆ν, and
• q 6 (σ, δ, i) ∈ ∆ν .
There are two cases. If δ = 0, then we must have i = 0; since ν is β-stable, there
can be no condition below q which adds a child of σ to ν (since then we can use the
retagging lemma to force this below p, which already forces that σ is terminal in ν), and
so q  (σ, 0, 0) ∈ ∆ν .
So suppose δ > 0. Since p  rkν(σ) = δ, by the previous lemma we have q  rkν(σ) = δ;
so q just disagrees on whether σ is safe, which means we must be able to find some r ≤ q
such that
r  (σ, δ, 1 − i) ∈ ∆ν .
By the retagging lemma we can find an rˆ ≤ p such that rˆ ≈κ+ω1(δ2+1) r.
Now the proof breaks into two subcases based on whether i = 0 or i = 1. We treat the
first case; the proofs are essentially identical.
We have r ≈κ+ω1(δ2+1) rˆ and r  (σ, δ, 1) ∈ ∆ν . Since r thinks σ is safe, r must think
there is some immediate successor of σ which is unsafe. That is, we can find s ≤ r, θ < δ,
and a ∈ R such that s  (σa〈a〉, θ, 0) ∈ ∆ν ; by retagging again we can find
sˆ ≤ rˆ, sˆ ≈κ+ω1(θ2+2) s,
which by our assumption on δ means that
sˆ  σa〈a〉 ∈ ν and is unsafe.
But sˆ ≤ rˆ ≤ p and p believes σ is unsafe, which means p believes σ has no safe extensions
- a contradiction. 
Finally, we are ready to show that ν is determined in M :
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Corollary 3.20. Let ν be a β-stable name for a well-founded subtree of R<ω, viewed
as a clopen game, with rk(ν) < α < ω2 for some limit ordinal α. Then there is an
(β + ω1(α4 + 5))-stable name for a (type-2 functional coding a) winning strategy for ν.
Proof. (Note that requiring α to be a limit is a benign hypothesis, as we can always
make α larger if necessary; this assumption is just made to simplify some ordinal arithmetic
below.) Recall that ≤W is a well-ordering of R in V . Let µ be a name for the type-2
functional which encodes the strategy picking out the ≤W -least winning move at any given
stage:
µ[G](naσ) =
{
a(n) if a is the ≤W -least real such that ∃β < α[(σ
a〈a〉, β, 0) ∈ ∆ν ],
0 if no such real s exists.
For simplicity, we assume that “no string containing a ‘0’ is on ν,” so that there is no
ambiguity in this definition. Clearly µ yields a winning strategy for whichever player wins
ν.
All that remains to show is that µ is stable. Let λ = (β + ω1(α4 + 5)), fix σ and a, and
let p ≈λ q are conditions in P such that p  µ(σ) = a. We can find some r ≤ q and some
b such that q′  µ(σ) = b; we’ll show that b = a, and so we must have had q  µ(σ) = a
already.
There are two cases:
Case 1: a = 0. Suppose towards a contradiction that b 6= 0. Since a = 0, we have p 
∀δ < α,∀b ∈ R[(σa〈b〉, δ, 0) 6∈ ∆ν ]. Let s ≤ r and δ < α be such that s  (σ
a〈b〉, δ, 0) ∈ ∆ν ;
by the retagging lemma, there is p′ ≤ p with p′ ≈β+ω1(α4+4) s, which by Lemma 3.19 is
impossible.
Case 2: a 6= 0. By identical logic as in the previous case, we must have b 6= 0; suppose
towards contradiction that b 6= a. With two applications of the retagging lemma, we can
find ordinals δ0, δ1 < α and conditions p
′ ≤ p, r′ ≤ r such that
• p′ ≈β+ω1(α4+2) r
′,
• p′  (σa〈a〉, δ0, 0) ∈ ∆ν , and
• r′  (σa〈b〉, δ1, 0) ∈ ∆ν .
By Lemma 3.19, we have r′  (σa〈a〉, δ0, 0) ∈ ∆ν and p
′  (σa〈b〉, δ1, 0) ∈ ∆ν as well. Also
note that we have p′  µ(σ) = a, r′  µ(σ) = b, since p′ ≤ p and r′ ≤ r ≤ q. Now since
a 6= b, either a <W b or b <W a, and so either way we have a contradiction.
This completes the proof. 
Since M1 = R, M computes well-foundedness of subtrees of R
<ω correctly; so by 3.16,
it then follows that every clopen game in M has a winning strategy in M . Together with
3.9 and 3.11, this completes the proof of Theorem 3.5. 
TRANSFINITE RECURSION IN HIGHER REVERSE MATHEMATICS 29
4. RCA30 versus RCA
ω
0
In this section we review Kohlenbach’s original base theory RCAω0 , and show that it is
equivalent to our base theory RCA30 in a precise sense.
Definition 4.1. Let Lω be the many-sorted language consisting of
• a sort tσ for each finite type σ ∈ FT ,
• application operators
·σ,ρ : tσ→ρ × tσ → tρ
for all finite types,
• the signature of arithmetic for the type-0 functionals, and
• equality predicates =σ for each σ ∈ FT .
RCAω0 is the L
ω-theory consisting of the following axioms:
• The ordered semiring axioms, P−, for the type-0 objects, and extensionality axioms
for all the finite types;
• the schemata
∃Πσ→(τ→τ)∀Xσ, Y τ (ΠXY = Y )
and
∃Σ(σ→(ρ→τ))→((σ→ρ)→(σ→τ))∀Xσ→(ρ→τ), Y σ→ρ, Zσ(((ΣX)Y )Z = (XZ)(Y Z))
defining the K- and S-combinators, respectively;
• the axiom R0 asserting the existence of a primitive recursion functional, which for
clarity we will always denote R0:
∃R
0→((0→1)→(0→0))
0 ∀x
0, g0→1, k0(R0(x, g)(0) = x ∧R0(x, g)(k + 1) = g(R0(x, g)(k)), k);
and
• the choice scheme QF-AC(1,0), which consists — for each quantifier-free formula
ϕ(X1, y0) in only the displayed free variables, containing no equality predicate of
type 6= 0 — of the axiom
∀X1∃y0ϕ(X, y) =⇒ ∃F 2∀X1ϕ(X,F (X)).
We will prove that RCAω0 is a conservative extension of RCA
3
0.
9
To begin, we need some basic results about pairing higher-type objects.
Definition 4.2. Fix a pairing operator 〈·, ·〉 on natural numbers. In a slight abuse of
notation, for reals x, y we let 〈x, y〉 be the real gotten by pairing x and y pointwise:
〈x, y〉 : a 7→ 〈x(a), y(a)〉.
For a finite sequence c of objects which are either all reals or all naturals, let 〈c〉 be the
usual coding of c by repeated use of the appropriate-type pairing operator 〈·, ·〉, associating
to the right.
9Since the language of RCAω0 does not include the symbol ∗, it is technically better to say that RCA
3
0 is
a conservative extension of a subtheory of RCAω0 ; however, since this will not be an issue, we ignore this
point going forward.
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For a a real, we let a˜ = a; for b ∈ ω, we let
b˜ = “n 7→ b.”
For c a finite sequence of objects which are each either reals or naturals, let
〈c〉
R
= 〈c˜0, c˜1, ...〉.
We write pii for the projection map onto the ith coordinate; both RCA
ω
0 and RCA
3
0 prove
the existence of the relevant projection functionals. (In the case of RCA30, a real-valued
projection pii(〈w〉R) is given by Fi ∗ (〈wR〉) for a certain functional Fi.) Throughout, we use
the pairing functions and projection maps in formulas putatively in the language L3 or Lω,
even though those symbols are not in either language, when it is clear that no expressive
power is added.
We begin with the easier result: that RCA30 is a subtheory of RCA
ω
0 .
Lemma 4.3. Whenever
N = (Nσ)σ∈FT |= RCA
ω
0 ,
we have (N0, N1, N2) |= RCA
3
0 (with the symbols
a and ∗ interpreted in the obvious way).
Proof. The proof that N contains functionals of type 2 → (1 → 1) and 0 → (1 → 1)
corresponding to ∗ and a, respectively, is not hard. It is somewhat tedious, however — for
example, constructing a term corresponding to a requires a definition by cases, and relies
on the functional R0 — and so we omit it.
Since RCAω0 proves P
−, extensionality, and Σ01-induction,
10 it now suffices to show that
RCAω0 proves the ∆
0
1 comprehension schemata for type 1 and 2 objects; since the former
follows in turn from the latter and a bit of coding, we just need to prove ∆01 comprehension
for type 2 objects in RCAω0 .
Definition 4.4. An L3-formula ϕ(x) with parameters from N and only type-1 and type-0
variables is representable if there is some type-2 functional Fϕ ∈ N such that
N |= Fϕ(〈a〉R) = 1 ⇐⇒ ϕ(a).
Sublemma 4.5. All Σ00 formulas are representable.
Proof of claim. By induction on the number of bounded quantifiers. Note that the
representable formulas are closed under negation, so we need only consider one kind of
bounded quantifier.
The base case follows immediately from QF-AC(1,0): if ϕ(r) has no quantifiers, then
ψ(r, k) ≡ (k = 0 ∧ ¬ϕ(r)) ∨ (k = 1 ∧ ϕ(r))
is a quantifier-free formula, and applying QF-AC(1,0)to ψ yields a representing functional
for ϕ.
For the induction step, it is enough to show that
ϕ(r1) ≡ ∃x0 < F 2(r)(G2(〈x, r〉) = 1)
10See [Koh05].
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is representable whenever F,G ∈ N are type-2 parameters. The key tool here is the
primitive recursion operator, R0. Using R0, we can define a functional H whose value on
a real r is computed by starting with 0, cycling through all naturals less than F (r) and
incrementing each time we encounter a solution to G(〈−, r〉) = 1; that is,
H(r) = 0 ⇐⇒ ∀x < F (r), G(〈x, r〉) = 0.
Rigorously, we let H be the type-2 functional defined by
λr1.R0(0, λx
0.(pi0(x) +G(〈pi1(x), r〉)))(F (r)),
and note that H is clearly in N . Then the representing functional we desire is simply
I : r 7→ JH(r) > 0K,
whose existence in N follows from applying the axiom QF-AC(1,0) to the formula
ϕ(r, k) ≡ (k = 0 ∧H(r) = 0) ∨ (k = 1 ∧H(r) > 0).
This finishes the proof of the sub-lemma. 
Now we can prove the full ∆01 comprehension scheme in RCA
ω
0 , as follows. Let
ϕ(X1, y0) ≡ ∃z0θ(X1, y0, z0)
be a Σ01 formula satisfying the hypothesis of the comprehension scheme, with θ ∈ Σ
0
0. By
the lemma, let F ∈ N be the functional such that
F (〈A1, b0, c0〉
R
) = 1 ⇐⇒ N |= θ(A, b, c).
Now consider the formula
ψ(X1, w0) ≡ w = 〈s, t〉 ∧ F (〈X, s, t〉
R
) = 1;
applying QF-AC(1,0) to ψ yields a functional G ∈ N of type 2, and ϕ is represented by the
functional
X1 7→ pi0(G(X)),
which is clearly in N . 
The other half of the equivalence is a conservativity result:
Theorem 4.6. RCAω0 is conservative over RCA
3
0, in the following sense: given any model
(M0,M1,M2;
a , ∗) of RCA30, there is a model N = (Nσ)σ∈FS of RCA
ω
0 with the same first-,
second-, and third-order parts and corresponding application operators:
M0 = N0,M1 = N1,M2 =M2, ·
M
0 = ·
N
0,0, ·
M
1 = ·
N
1,0.
Proof. Let M = (M0,M1,M2) |= RCA
3
0. Define the set of λ-terms over M as follows:
Definition 4.7. Fix M |=RCA30. The set of λ-terms over M is defined inductively as
follows:
• If t is an L3-term of type σ, then t is a λ-term of type σ.
• If t, s are λ-terms of types σ → τ and σ respectively, then ((t)(s)) is a λ-term of
type τ .
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• If t is a λ-term of type σ, x is a variable of type ρ, and the expression “λx” does
not occur in t, then λx.(t) is a λ-term of type ρ→ σ.
Free and bound variables are defined as usual. A λ-term λxσ.θ(x) is intended to denote the
map a 7→ θ(a), and so the set of (appropriate equivalence classes of) λ-terms is meant to
define a type-structure. For simplicity, we will refer to λ-terms overM simply as “λ-terms.”
We let T be the set of all λ-terms. We say that t ∈ T is closed if t has no free variables,
that is, if each variable appearing in t is within the scope of a λ.
Now, let ≡ext be the smallest equivalence relation on T satisfying the following:
• If a, b are L3-terms and M |= a = b, then a ≡ext b.
• For all λ-terms s of type σ in which the variable xσ does not appear and all λ-terms
t, we have
((λxσ.t)(s)) ≡ t[s/x].
(Recall that ⌉[a/b] denotes the expression gotten by replacing each occurence of a
by b in ⌉.)
• If t, s are λ-terms of type (σ → τ) such that
t(a) ≡ext s(a)
for all a of type σ, then t ≡ext s.
• If t, s are λ-terms of type 1 and t(a) ≡ext s(a) for all a ∈M0, then t ≡ext s.
• If t, s are λ-terms of type 2 and t(a) ≡ext s(a) for all a ∈M1, then t ≡ext s.
Our desired model, N , will be built out of these ≡ext-classes. The first step towards an
analysis of ≡ext-classes of λ-terms is the following classical result, here stated in a form
slightly weaker than usual but more directly useful for our purposes:
Definition 4.8. A λ-term t is in normal form if it contains no subterm of the form
((λx.s)(u))
Theorem 4.9. (Normal Form Theorem) For each λ-term t, there is a λ-term s in
normal form such that
t ≡ext s.
See, e.g., section 4.3 of [GTL89] for a proof. The value of the normal form theorem is
that it allows us to focus our attention on only nicely-behaved λ-terms. The relevant nice
behavior is captured in the following lemma:
Lemma 4.10. Let t be a λ-term in normal form. Then:
(1) Every subterm of t is in normal form.
(2) If t has standard type (that is, type 0, 1, 2, etc.), then every subterm of t also has
standard type.
(3) If t is of type 0 or 1, then all bound variables in t are of type 0.
(4) If t is of type 2, then t contains at most one bound variable of type 1, and all other
bound variables are of type 0.
(5) If t is of type 0, 1, or 2, then every subterm of t is of type 0, 1, or 2.
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Proof. (1) is immediate. For (2), suppose that t has standard type, and suppose t has
subterms of non-standard type. Note that, by induction, every λ-term of non-standard
type has form either s0(s1) or λx
σ.s0. Now let s be the minimal leftmost λ-subterm of
t which has nonstandard type; that is, let s be the unique subterm of t such that (i) no
subterm of t containing any characters to the left of s is of nonstandard type, and (ii) s is
the shortest subterm of t with property (i). Then s clearly cannot be of the form s0(s1),
since then s0 would also need to be of nonstandard type and would then contradict the
minimality of s among leftmost nonstandard-type λ-terms; so s is of the form λxσ.u. But
since there is no λ-term of nonstandard type occuring to the left of s, and only λ-terms
of nonstandard type can be applied to s on the left, we must have that s is bound by an
application on the right. This immediately contradicts the normality of t, by (1).
For (3), suppose t contains a bound variable yσ of type σ 6= 0. The subterm in which y
appears bound, λy.s, then has type σ → τ for some τ ∈ FT . As in the proof of (2), let u
be the minimal leftmost subterm of t which contains λy.s and has type 6= 0; since t is in
normal form, u must be of the form
λxσ00 .λx
σ1
1 ...λx
σn
n .λy
σ.s.
Now since t has type 0 or 1, u must be on the left or right side of an application. Since t is
in normal form, u must be on the right side of an application; that is, t contains a subterm
of the form ((v)(u)). But v cannot be a parameter from M , since the type of u has height
at least 2, so v is of the form λz.w; so ((v)(u)) is not in normal form, contradicting (1).
(4) follows similarly to (3). Since t has type 2, t may have the form λy1.s, in which case
it contains at least one bound variable of type 1; but then s has type 0, and so by (3) y is
the only bound variable of type 6= 0 occuring in t.
(5) follows the pattern of the previous parts. Towards contradiction, consider the min-
imal leftmost subterm s of t of type n > 2; then no functional can apply to s on the left,
and binding s with a λ would result in a subterm of nonstandard type, contradicting (2),
so s must be on the left of an application. But by minimality s has the form λx1.u, so this
contradicts the normality of t. 
Definition 4.11. Let T ∗i be the set of all closed λ-terms of type i, for i ∈ {0, 1, 2}. For
i ∈ 3, let ei : Mi → T
∗
i be the map
ei : a 7→ [a]ext.
Our immediate goal is to show that the ei are bijections. The remainder of the conser-
vativity proof will then follow easily. Injectivity is straightforward; to show surjectivity,
we use the following construction:
Definition 4.12. Fix a type-1 variable y1. Let T be the set of ordered pairs (t, S), where
t is a λ-term in normal form of type 0 or 1 containing no free variables of nonzero type
besides possibly y, and S = (x0, ..., xm) is a list of type-0 variables including all those
occurring in t.
For (t, (xi)i<n) ∈ T , say that F ∈M2 codes (t, (xi)i<n) if
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• either t is of type 0, and for all a0, ..., an−1 ∈M0, b ∈M1, we have
F (a0
a...aan−1
ab) ≡ext t(a0/x0, ..., an−1/xn−1, b/y);
• or t is of type 1, and for all a0, ..., an−1 ∈M0, b ∈M1, we have
F ∗ (a0
a...aan−1
ab) ≡ext t(a0/x0, ..., an−1/xn−1, b/y).
The key lemma is the following:
Lemma 4.13. Every (t, (xi)i<n) ∈ T is coded by some F ∈M2.
Proof. We will prove the lemma by induction on the complexity of t; note that by Lemma
4.10, if (t, (xi)i<n) ∈ T , then (t, (xi)i<n) ∈ T for all subterms s of t, so an induction is
possible. For this induction, we make the following abbreviations. For pi a permutation of
n for n ∈ ω, we let Rpi be the type-2 functional satisfying
∀r ∈M1, i ∈M0 : (Rpi ∗ r)(i) =
{
r(pi(i)) if i < n,
r(i) if n ≤ i.
For n ∈ ω, we let Pn be the type-2 functional satisfying
∀r ∈M1, i ∈M0 : (Pn ∗ r)(i) = r(n+ i).
The existence of such functionals inM2 is an easy consequence of the type-2 comprehension
scheme. Finally, recall (2.2) the definition of the language L3, as well as our convention
that “L3-term” means “L3-term with parameters.” The induction then proceeds as follows:
Fix (t, (xi)i<n) ∈ T , and suppose that for all subterms of t, and all appropriate lists of
variables, the result holds.
For t an L3-term, the comprehension scheme for type-2 functionals gives us the desired
F immediately. If t has type 0, apply comprehension to the formula
Φ(u1, v0) ≡ v = t[u(0)/x0, ..., u(n − 1)/xn−1, (Pn ∗ u)/y],
and if t has type 1, apply comprehension to the formula
Ψ(u1, v0) ≡ v = t[u(1)/x0, ..., u(n)/xn−1, (Pn+1 ∗ u)/y](u(0)).
Clearly the so-defined F codes (t, (xi)i<n).
If t is of the form s0+ s1, by induction let F0, F1 represent (s0, (xi)i<n) and (s1, (xi)i<n)
respectively. Then
F : u1 7→ F0(u) + F1(u),
whose existence is again guaranteed by comprehension, clearly codes (t, (xi)i<n). (Multi-
plication and successor are handled identically.)
If t = λz0.s, note that t necessarily has type 1. By induction letG represent (s, (z, x0, ..., xn−1)).
Then G also codes (t, (xi)i<n).
If t = s0(s1), then by 4.10(5) s0 has type either 1 or 2. If s0 has type 1 (and so s1 has
type 0), let F0 and F1 represent (s0, (xi)i<n) and (s1, (xi)i<n) respectively. Then
F : u1 7→ (F0 ∗ u)(F1(u))
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codes (t, (xi)i<n), and is guaranteed to exist by comprehension.
Finally, suppose t = s0(s1) and s0 has type 2. Note that s0 cannot be of the form λy
1.u,
since t is in normal form. Similarly, if s0 were of the form u(v), then u would have to have
non-standard type, and this would contradict 4.10(2). This leaves as the only possibility
that s0 is a single type-2 parameter, that is, t is of the form
F (s1)
for some parameter F ∈ M2. By induction, let G code s1; then the functional H defined
by
H : r 7→ F (G ∗ r)
is in M by comprehension, and codes t.
Since these are all the cases which can arise, this completes the induction. 
As an immediate corollary, we get the surjectivity of e2:
Corollary 4.14. For each closed λ-term t of type 2, there is some F ∈ M2 such that
F ≡ext t.
Proof. By 4.9, we can assume t is in normal form; then either t is an L3-term, in which
case we are done, or t has the form
t = λy1.s.
Applying Lemma 4.13 to s, we get an F ∈M2 such that for all b ∈M1, F (b) = s[b/y]; and
so t ≡ext F . 
This then passes to e1 and e0:
Corollary 4.15. For each closed λ-term t of type 0 (type 1), there is an a ∈M0 (b ∈M1)
such that t ≡ext a (t ≡ext b).
Proof. For the type 1 case, let λx0.s be a λ-term of type 1; now consider the type-2 term
t′ = λy1.s[y(0)/x]; by Corollary 4.14, t′ ≡ext F for some F ∈ M2. But then consider the
real f : k0 7→ F (ka0), which is in M1 by comprehension; clearly f ≡ext t since F ≡ext t
′, so
we are done.
The type 0 case follows similarly. Let t be a λ-term of type 0, and consider the type-2
term t′ = λy1.t. Taking F ∈ M2 such that F ≡ext t
′, we must have F (0) ≡ext t; but
F (0) ∈M0. 
Now consider the following Lω-structure NM , defined as follows:
• Nσ = T
∗
σ .
• Application in N is defined as
·σ,ρ : ([t]ext, [s]ext) 7→ [((t)(s))]ext.
• The arithmetic functions are transferred from M0 to N0 in the obvious way; for
example,
+N : ([a]ext, [b]ext) 7→ [a+ b]ext,
etc.
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• The relation <N is defined by
<N= {([a]ext, [b]ext) : a, b ∈M0,M |= a < b}.
Lemma 4.16. NM |=RCA
ω
0 .
Proof. Extensionality and P− for the type-0 functionals hold trivially. The Π and Σ
combinators are easily expressed as λ-terms, and so the corresponding axioms are satisfied.
The primitive recursion axiom, R0, takes a bit more work to express as a λ-term. By
Σ01 induction in M , for any real r
1 ∈M1 and any naturals a
0, b0 ∈M0, there is a (natural
number coding a) primitive recursive derivation for
R0(a, r)(b) = k
for a unique k ∈ M0. This lets us apply the ∆
0
1 comprehension scheme for type-2 func-
tionals, and so it follows that there is an F ∈M2 such that F (a
0ab0ar1) = k0 if and only
if there is a code for a primitive recursive derivation of R0(r, a)(b) = k. Now consider the
λ-term
t := λx0.λr1.λy0.(F (xayar));
by definition of F , [t]ext clearly witnesses the axiom R0 in N .
Finally, the choice principle QF-AC(1,0)requires a bit of work: an appropriate quantifier-
free formula Φ may contain high-type parameters, in which case the comprehension scheme
in M does not directly apply. Instead, we have to essentially lower the types of the
parameters, using the coding provided by Lemma 4.13.
Let Φ(y1, x0) be a quantifier-free formula in the displayed free variables, containing no
occurrences of =σ for σ 6= 0. Then since Φ contains no higher-type equality predicates,
every maximal term in Φ must have type 0. Let t0, ..., tm be a list of these maximal terms,
so that Φ is a Boolean combination of formulas of the form ti = tj or ti < tj for i, j ≤ m.
Note that each ti has free variables from among {y
1, x0}. Thus, by Lemma 4.13, we can
find functionals F0, ..., Fm ∈ M2 such that Fi(a
ab) ≡ext ti[a/x, b/y] for every a ∈ M0, b ∈
M1. Let Φˆ be the quantifier-free formula gotten from Φ by replacing each ti by Fi(x
ay)
for each i ≤ m; then applying comprehension to Φˆ yields a type-2 functional G ∈M2, and
it is easily checked that
∀b ∈ N1(Φ(b, [G]ext(b))).
This completes the proof. 
Theorem 4.6 is thus proved. 
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have sought to understand how the passage to higher types affects
mathematical constructions related to the system ATR0; given both the sheer number
of such constructions, and the relative youth of higher-order reverse mathematics, this
remains necessarily incomplete. We close by mentioning four particular directions for
further research we find most immediately compelling.
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5.1. Despite the analysis provided by this paper, there are still basic questions remaining
unaddressed. It is unclear whether ΣR1 -Det implies Σ
2
1-Sep
R, or whether ∆R1 -Det implies
WO(R). We suspect that neither implication holds, but separations at this level are unclear:
for example, it is open even whether ΣR1 -Det implies the Π
2
2-comprehension principle for
type-2 functionals, although the answer is almost certainly that it does not.
For that matter, in this paper we have focused entirely on the strengths of third-order
theorems relative to other third-order theorems; their strength relative to second-order
principles has been completely unexplored. For instance, it is entirely possible, albeit
unlikely, that ∆R1 -Det and Σ
R
1 -Det have the same second-order consequences.
5.2. There is also a lingering question regarding our main theorem: can clopen and open
determinacy for reals be separated in a simpler way? Specifically, there is a reasonable
“smallest natural” model N = (ω,RL, N3) of RCA
3
0+∆
R
1 -Det, with N3 the set of all type-2
functionals in Lα where α is the least ordinal such that this model satisfies ∆
R
1 -Det. It
is then natural to ask whether N |=ΣR1 -Det. Either answer to this question would be
interesting, as well as answering this question for other natural models of RCA30+∆
R
1 -Det.
5.3. One interesting aspect of the shift to higher types we have not touched on at all
is the extra structure available in higher-type versions of classical theorems. Given a Π12
principle
ϕ ≡ ∀X1∃Y 1θ(X,Y ),
we can take its higher-type (so prima facie Π22) analogue
ϕ∗ ≡ ∀F 2∃G2θ∗(F,G).
Now, individual reals are topologically uninteresting, but passing to a higher type changes
the situation considerably. Specifically, we can consider topologically restricted versions of
ϕ∗: given a pointclass Γ, let
ϕ∗[Γ] ≡ ∀F 2 ∈ Γ∃G2θ(F,G).
The relevant example is restricted forms of determinacy: the principles ∆R1 -Det[Γ] (resp.,
ΣR1 -Det[Γ]) assert determinacy for clopen (resp., open) games whose underlying trees when
viewed as sets of reals are in Γ. In particular, the system ΣR1 -Det[Open] is extremely weak,
at least by the standards of higher-type determinacy theorems: it is equivalent over RCA30
to the classical system ATR0.
The techniques used in the proof of Theorem 3.5 are topologically badly behaved. In par-
ticular, they tell us nothing about the restricted versions ∆R1 -Det[Γ] and Σ
R
1 -Det[Γ]. With
some work the argument of this paper might extend to showing that ∆R1 -Det[Γ] 6⊢ Σ
R
1 -Det[Γ]
over RCA30, for reasonably large pointclasses Γ, but not immediately; and certainly a de-
tailed understanding of which restricted forms of open determinacy for reals are implied
by which restricted forms of clopen determinacy will require substantially new ideas. This
finer structure seems to allow a rich connection between classical descriptive set theory and
higher reverse mathematics, and is worth investigating.
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5.4. Finally, there is a serious foundational question regarding the base theory for higher-
order reverse mathematics. The language of higher types is a natural framework for reverse
mathematics, as explained at the beginning of section 2.1; however, the specific base the-
ory RCAω0 is not entirely justified from a computability-theoretic point of view. While
proof-theoretically natural, it does not necessarily capture “computable higher-type math-
ematics.” The most glaring exmaple of this concerns the Turing jump operator. In the
theory RCAω0 , the existence of a functional corresponding to the jump operator
J
1→1 : f 7→ f ′
is conservative over ACA0 ([Hun08], Theorem 2.5). However, intuitively we can compute
the ωth jump (and much more) of a given real by iterating J; thus, given a model M of
RCAω0 , there may be algorithms using only parameters from M and effective operations
which compute reals not in M . From a computability theoretic point of view, then, RCAω0
may be an unsatisfactorily weak base theory.
Of course, this discussion hinges on what, precisely, “computability” means for higher
types. A convincing approach is given in [Kle59], justified by arguments by Kleene and
others (see especially [Gan67]) similar in spirit to Turing’s original informal argument. It is
thus desirable — at least for higher-type reverse mathematics motivated by computability
theory, as opposed to proof theory — to have a base theory corresponding to full Kleene
recursion.11 We will address these, and other, aspects of the base theory issue in a future
paper. However, the search for the “right” base theory is very fertile mathematical ground,
drawing on and responding to foundational ideas from proof theory, generalized recursion
theory, and even set theory, and deserves attention from many corners and active debate.
References
[Fef64] Solomon Feferman. Independence of the axiom of choice from the axiom of dependent choices. J.
Symbolic Logic, 29:226, 1964.
[FHR11] Gunter Fuchs, Joel David Hamkins, and Jonas Reitz. Set-theoretic geology. Published in the
ArXiv, 07 2011.
[Fri75a] Harvey Friedman. The analysis of mathematical texts, and their calibration in terms of intrinsic
strength I. Published on author’s website, 1975.
[Fri75b] Harvey Friedman. Some systems of second order arithmetic and their use. In Proceedings of the In-
ternational Congress of Mathematicians (Vancouver, B. C., 1974), Vol. 1, pages 235–242. Canad.
Math. Congress, Montreal, Que., 1975.
11It should be noted that the separation of ∆R1 -Det and Σ
R
1 -Det in this paper does not suffer from the
choice of base theory. This is because — by an induction on indices — Kleene computability from a type-2
object satisfies the following countable use condition: if F is a given type-2 object, and ϕFe is a type-2 object
computed from F , then for each real r there is a countable set of reals Cr such that
∀G2(G ↾ Cr = F ↾ Cr =⇒ ϕ
F
e (r) = ϕ
G
e (r)).
It follows by essentially the same argument as 3.11 that M is closed under Kleene reduction. In fact, all
separations in this paper — with the possible exception of 2.14, whose proof is more technically delicate —
still hold over this stronger base theory.
TRANSFINITE RECURSION IN HIGHER REVERSE MATHEMATICS 39
[Gan67] R. O. Gandy. Computable functionals of finite type. I. In Sets, Models and Recursion Theory
(Proc. Summer School Math. Logic and Tenth Logic Colloq., Leicester, 1965), pages 202–242.
North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1967.
[GK13] Noam Greenberg and Julia F. Knight. Computable structure theory using admissible recursion
theory on ω1. In Effective Mathematics of the Uncountable. Cambridge University Press, 2013.
[GTL89] Jean-Yves Girard, Paul Taylor, and Yves Lafont. Proofs and Types, volume 7 of Cambridge Tracts
in Theoretical Computer Science. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989.
[Har68] Joseph Harrison. Recursive pseudo-well-orderings. Trans. Amer. Math. Soc., 131:526–543, 1968.
[Hun08] James Hunter. Higher-order reverse topology. ProQuest LLC, Ann Arbor, MI, 2008. Thesis
(Ph.D.)–The University of Wisconsin - Madison.
[Jec03] Thomas Jech. Set theory. Springer Monographs in Mathematics. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 2003.
The third millennium edition, revised and expanded.
[Kec95] Alexander S. Kechris. Classical descriptive set theory, volume 156 of Graduate Texts in Mathe-
matics. Springer-Verlag, New York, 1995.
[Kle59] S. C. Kleene. Recursive functionals and quantifiers of finite types. I. Trans. Amer. Math. Soc.,
91:1–52, 1959.
[Koh05] Ulrich Kohlenbach. Higher order reverse mathematics. In Reverse mathematics 2001, volume 21
of Lect. Notes Log., pages 281–295. Assoc. Symbol. Logic, La Jolla, CA, 2005.
[Kre12] Alexander P. Kreuzer. Non-principal ultrafilters, program extraction and higher-order reverse
mathematics. J. Math. Log., 12(1):1250002, 16, 2012.
[Kun83] Kenneth Kunen. Set theory, volume 102 of Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathemat-
ics. North-Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam, 1983. An introduction to independence proofs,
Reprint of the 1980 original.
[Lon05] John R. Longley. Notions of computability at higher types. I. In Logic Colloquium 2000, volume 19
of Lect. Notes Log., pages 32–142. Assoc. Symbol. Logic, Urbana, IL, 2005.
[Man96] Mar´ıa Manzano. Extensions of first order logic, volume 19 of Cambridge Tracts in Theoretical
Computer Science. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996.
[Mon08] Antonio Montalba´n. On the Π11-separation principle. MLQ Math. Log. Q., 54(6):563–578, 2008.
[Mos67] Yiannis N. Moschovakis. Hyperanalytic predicates. Trans. Amer. Math. Soc., 129:249–282, 1967.
[Mos09] Yiannis N. Moschovakis. Descriptive set theory, volume 155 of Mathematical Surveys and Mono-
graphs. American Mathematical Society, Providence, RI, second edition, 2009.
[Nee11] Itay Neeman. Necessary use of Σ11 induction in a reversal. J. Symbolic Logic, 76(2):561–574, 2011.
[Sch] Noah Schweber. —. PhD thesis, University of California, Berkeley.
[Sho13] Richard A. Shore. Reverse mathematics, countable and uncountable: a computational approach.
In Effective Mathematics of the Uncountable. Cambridge University Press, 2013.
[Sim99] Stephen G. Simpson. Subsystems of second order arithmetic. Perspectives in Mathematical Logic.
Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1999.
[Ste78] John R. Steel. Forcing with tagged trees. Ann. Math. Logic, 15(1):55–74, 1978.
[SY04] Nobuyuki Sakamoto and Takeshi Yamazaki. Uniform versions of some axioms of second order
arithmetic. MLQ Math. Log. Q., 50(6):587–593, 2004.
[Tow11] Henry Towsner. Ultrafilters in reverse mathematics. Published in the ArXiv, 09 2011.
[vdW30] Bartel L. van der Waerden. Eine Bemerkung u¨ber die Unzerlegbarkeit von Polynomen. Math.
Ann., 102(1):738–739, 1930.
Department of Mathematics, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, California
94720 U.S.A. E-mail address: schweber@math.berkeley.edu
